Grand Strategy in the Age of Mass Destruction

The Great Debate:

Revisiting the Sino-Soviet Split

and the Failure of the “China Card”

By Nevin Gussack

September 2011



Executive Summary


In 1960 the communist world was struck with a seemingly major setback in their monolithic unity in the form of the Sino-Soviet split. In the eyes of U.S. policymakers and intelligence officials, this event presented both a unique opportunity to further the dissension within the socialist community for some and great fear of a grand deception for others. The Central Intelligence Agency was the main battleground for the war over the validity of the Sino-Soviet Deception and the ultimate decision to forge relations with the People’s Republic of China as a means of containing and limiting the ambitions of the USSR. Meanwhile, the conservative and anti-communist movement in America was divided as to how to react and present the news of renewed relations with the People’s Republic of China to their supporters. Some decided to support the notion of a “China Card” directed against the Soviet Union as an exercise in Metternich style Realpolitik, while other anti-communists, loyal to Free China in Taiwan, felt that this was nothing but a grand deception whose ultimate aim was the crippling of the Free World and capitalism. In light of the communist Chinese-Russian Federation alliance and their strategic, deleterious influence within the U.S. economy, analysts need to explore the background and validity of the Sino-Soviet split of the old “Cold War” days. Such analysts need honestly review the evidence as to whether:

a) Would China would remain a non-hostile state vis a vis the United States?

b) If the Sino-Soviet split was bona fide, would the two great communist powers eventually heal their conflict and unite on the basis of communist and anti-U.S. solidarity?

c) Was the Sino-Soviet Split a strategic deception from the start, as former CIA Counter-Intelligence Chief James Angleton and Soviet KGB defector Major Anatoli Golitsyn charged?

Based on the evidence presented in this essay, one can come to the following conclusions: despite the pretensions of friendship and non-hostility, China was irrevocably committed to the destruction of the capitalist and imperialist U.S.A. and the Sino-Soviet dispute was either a strategic deception or a conflict that could be healed under the rubric of internationalist communist solidarity. Indeed, the open split was publicly healed as the 1980s progressed and became an unrealized threat to the NATO countries, CONUS, and the non-communist Asian countries. Such an anti-American axis developed and morphed into what is presently called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).


Pronouncement of Alliance in the 1960s

                Beginning in the 1960s, many Western analysts were searching for means to utilize the so called “China Card” as a means to apply geopolitical pressure the Soviet Union and their allies worldwide. However, the actual historical record in the 1960s illustrated that trade, military, and some party to party ties were maintained by China and the Soviet Union. Both states were irrevocably committed to the defense of each other and the expansion of world communism. Mao noted to Khrushchev in a 1958 meeting that: “In case of war we should definitely cooperate.”[1] Mao and Khrushchev then conversed about future wartime collaboration:

N.S. Khrushchev: I said that, when the war begins, we would have to use the coast widely, including Vietnam.

Mao Zedong: I already said that, in case of war, the Soviet Union will use any part of China, [and] Russian sailors will be able to act in any port of China.

N.S. Khrushchev: I would not speak about Russian sailors. Joint efforts are needed if war breaks out. Perhaps Chinese sailors would act, perhaps joint efforts would be necessary. But we did not raise the question about any territory or our base there.”[2] It was reported that Mao and Khrushchev noted that communism was making gains in the world during 1959: Overall, the international situation is favorable for the socialist camp, underlined Mao Tse-Tung. He said: “Comrade Khrushchev and the CC CPSU undertook good measures in relation to the United States of America.” The imperialists, Mao Tse-Tung added, have many weaknesses. They have serious internal contradictions. A rapid swell in the anti-imperialist liberation movement is occurring in Africa and Latin America. As far as Asia is concerned, continued Mao Tse-Tung, here on the surface there is a certain decline [in the movement], explainable by the fact that in many countries of Asia the national bourgeoisie has already taken power. This has not taken place in Africa and Latin America. These two continents present for the USA, England, and France a source of trouble and tasks which are difficult to solve.[3] The Mao Khrushchev conversation from 1958 clearly indicated Sino-Soviet unity and military cooperation in a world war against the capitalist states. The 1959 conversation between Mao and Khrushchev indicated approval for the political warfare conducted by the Soviet dictator against the United States and noted that the West in faced with threats emanating from Third World terrorist movements.

 In February 1963, Chinese Ambassador to the USSR Pan Tzu Li held a meeting with General Secretary Khrushchev. The Soviet dictator let it be known that “I promise you that when we throw the last shovel on the grave of capitalism, we will throw it with China.”The Soviet dictator was then asked: “Is this a beginning?” Khrushchev then answered: “No, not a beginning. This started a long time ago. Our parties have cooperated and will cooperate.”[4] In the same year, the Chinese wrote a letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), where they called for the utilization of contradictions within the imperialist camp and to unify under the common goal of socialism: “The contradictions among the imperialist powers and especially those between the United States imperialism and other imperialist powers are becoming deeper and sharper and new conflicts are developing among them. In this situation, what is of decisive significance for the international cause of the proletariat as a whole is the struggle against imperialism headed by the United States and the support for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America…It is the common desire of the people of China and the Soviet Union, of all the people in the socialist camp of the communists of all countries and of all the oppressed nations and people of the world over to strengthen the unity of the socialist camp and especially to strengthen the unity of our two parties and countries.”[5] Premier Chou En-Lai noted in 1963 that “Some people may have thoughts of using Sino-Soviet differences to deal with China and the Soviet Union separately. Those with such ideas will certainly be disappointed. On the contrary, if any act of aggression occurs against any Socialist country this would be an act of aggression against the whole Socialist camp. It would be impossible not to give support. If a country refused to give support, it would not be a Socialist country.”[6] Chou also pointed out in 1964 that “Whatever happens, the fraternal Chinese and Soviet peoples will stand together in any storm that breaks out in the world arena.” Chou also asserted that the common interests of the USSR and China are the same and “an objective fact and no one can deny it.” Chou condemned Western attempts to use China against the USSR as a disgusting plot by “reactionaries.” He added that “But as I see it, they had better not rejoice too soon.” Chou noted that “In the end, these differences will surely be resolved and the movement will be stronger and firmer as a result.”[7] During a celebration of the Bolshevik Revolution with Soviet officials, Chou noted that: “The friendship and unity between the Chinese and Soviet people, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, has withstood long-term tests both in years of revolution and war and in years of peaceful construction.”[8]  On the 15th Anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance, Mutual Assistance (1965), the Soviets sent a message to the Chinese leadership stating: “Our alliance, sealed by the treaty, is an obstacle in the way of the aggressive imperialist groups which are conducting provocations dangerous to the cause of peace and aggravating the international situation.”[9] In a communiqué issued by the Chinese Communist Party (1966), unity was promised between the PRC and USSR in case of a world war: “The revolutionary people of the world, the great international communist movement, the great socialist camp, and the great peoples of China and the Soviet Union will eventually sweep away all obstacles and unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Soviet people may rest assured that once the Soviet Union meets with imperialist aggression and puts up resolute resistance, China will definitely stand side by side with the Soviet Union and fight against the common enemy.”[10] Clearly, the high level officials of the Soviet Union and China spoke of the continuation of the alliance between the two communist giants. Any relatively minor, publicized differences between the USSR and the PRC on the tactics of burying the West are supplanted in favor of the common goal of destroying world capitalism. The Chinese and Soviets continued to publically declare that, in the event of a world war, they would lend the entire socialist camp mutual assistance. Interestingly, despite the “split,” both China and the USSR seemed to either explicitly or implicitly respect the friendship treaty signed in 1950. Recently declassified conversations between Chinese and Soviet bloc leaders lend credence as to the sincerity of the above mentioned quotes highlighting Sino-Soviet solidarity. Deng Xiaoping and Romanian Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu echoed the unity of the entire communist bloc during a worldwide conflict with the capitalist world in 1965:

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu :
Of course, we understand that in case of a war against imperialism we will have to act in common, but these actions – which require the mobilization of the whole people – must be performed on the basis of a close cooperation, with the independence of each country being observed, and the participation of each army as an independent army, as a national force. This will ensure that the effort of each country will really be an effort from all viewpoints.
Comrade Deng Xiaoping :
We wholly agree with your opinion. We acted like that during the war in Korea. We can tell you that, together with the Korean comrades, we drew up a battle plan, but on the basis of the principles put forward by comrade Ceausescu just now. We cannot admit the fact that Vietnam and Korea be subordinated to our country because China is a bigger country. But your experience is richer than ours because you came across such problems within the framework of COMECON and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. We know that you have fought and think that there are many people who agree with you.”[11]

Former Weather Underground terrorist Larry Grathwohl noted in a 1982 interview for the documentary No Place to Hide that upon a revolutionary collapse of the US Government, a coordinated foreign invasion and occupation of the United States would subsequently occur. In meetings of the Weather Underground (WUO) leadership, it was believed that: “The only thing that I could get was that they expected that the Cubans, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Russians would all want to occupy different portions of the United States.”[12] Since the top WUO leaders were in contact with many communist and Third World countries and movements, it would be interesting to explore the level of awareness and the specifics of the joint invasion and occupation efforts by the Soviets, their allies, and the Chinese. The above quote by Grathwohl may suggest a possible coordination between China, the USSR, North Vietnam (DRV), Cuba, and the WUO command structure on invasion, occupation, and governance of a defeated United States. How would the WUO be aware of such sensitive communist strategy by various foreign, hostile powers? A logical and sensible invasion and occupation strategy of the United States as briefly laid out by Grathwohl can only come through cooperation with China and the USSR.

Revelations of Major Anatoli Golitsyn

KGB defector Major Anatoli Golitsyn provided anecdotal evidence illustrating that the Sino-Soviet split was deception contrived to allow the USSR to develop their long range missiles, while allowing the PRC to seek increased Western assistance and trade. KGB Chairman Alexander Shelepin explained this strategy in a lecture to an inner circle of high KGB officers in 1959. In this lecture, Shelepin allegedly explained that a contrived split could be created to provide strategic disinformation to Western audiences.[13] Maj. Golistyn explained the alleged fake Sino-Soviet split as a part of what the KGB described as the “scissors strategy.” Golitsyn recalled that the purpose of the scissors strategy was as follows: “Duality in Sino-Soviet polemics is used to mask the nature of the goals and the degree of coordination in the communist effort to achieve them. The feigned disunity of the communist world promotes real disunity in the noncommunist world. Each blade of the communist pair of scissors makes the other more effective. The militancy of one nation helps the activist detente diplomacy of the other. Mutual charges of hegemonism help to create the right climate for one or the other to negotiate agreements with the West. False alignments, formed with third parties by each side against the other, make it easier to achieve specific communist goals, such as the acquisition of advanced technology or the negotiation of arms control agreements or communist penetration of the Arab and African states.In Western eyes the military, political, economic, and ideological threat from world communism appears diminished. In consequence Western determination to resist the advance of communism is undermined. At a later stage the communist strategists are left with the option of terminating the split and adopting the strategy of ‘one clenched fist.’”[14] Golitsyn then stated that the relations between China and anti-Soviet nations would be established as a result of being deceived by the PRC-Soviet split. These Third World and Western nations would then play the “China Card” against the Soviets. The Chinese would then have influence in these nations and be able to acquire valuable technology from them. At an opportune moment, Golitsyn then stated the secret Sino-Soviet alliance would then become open: “In each of these the scissors strategy will play its part; probably, as the final stroke, the scissors blades will close. The element of apparent duality in Soviet and Chinese policies will disappear. The hitherto concealed coordination between them will become visible and predominant. The Soviets and the Chinese will be officially reconciled. Thus the scissors strategy will develop logically into the ‘strategy of one clenched fist’ to provide the foundation and driving force of a world communist federation.” [15] Golitsyn then elaborated further: Before long, the communist strategists might be persuaded that the balance had swung irreversibly in their favor. In that event they might well decide on a Sino-Soviet ‘reconciliation.’ The scissors strategy would give way to the strategy of "one clenched fist." At that point the shift in the political and military balance would be plain for all to see. Convergence would not be between two equal parties, but would be on terms dictated by the communist bloc. The argument for accommodation with the overwhelming strength of communism would be virtually unanswerable. Pressures would build up for changes in the American political and economic system on the lines indicated in Sakharov's treatise. Traditional conservatives would be isolated and driven toward extremism. They might become the victims of a new McCarthyism of the left. The Soviet dissidents who are now extolled as heroes of the resistance to Soviet communism would play an active part in arguing for convergence. Their present supporters would be confronted with a choice of forsaking their idols or acknowledging the legitimacy of the new Soviet regime.”[16] Defecting GRU Colonel Stanislav Lunev reported in a 1998 interview with Jeff Nyquist that he suspected that China and the USSR had a secret alliance during the 1980s based on observations while posted in the PRC.[17] This anecdotal information from Col. Lunev seems to lend credence to Major Golitsyn’s information and opinions of the continued existence of a Sino-Soviet alliance lurking behind an iron curtain of double talk. As events unfolded in the 1980s, the Chinese and Soviets openly moved towards rapprochement, then a military, and political alliance which threatened the West. Both communist powers and their allies acquired massive infusions of technology and capital from businessmen and political elites in the capitalist world. Large multinational corporations and their globalist allies in the political class assumed that they could moderate or soften the attitudes of the international communist world through trade and the policy of differentiation (i.e. policy of the maverick/”good” versus the “bad” communist state). The USSR and China also hoped that this split would also convince the West that the bloc threat weakened as a result of ideological discord. This misperception would then convince Western governments to scale back military production and preparedness.

Voices in the Wilderness: Free World Voices Suspicious of the Sino-Soviet Split

A number of commentators, military, political, and intelligence personalities in the Free World voiced their suspicions on the veracity of the split between Moscow and Beijing. Such individuals were concerned that the USSR and China were deceiving the NATO countries and the United States. According to labor columnist Victor Riesel, the Sino Soviet split was a strategic disinformation ploy to “throw non-communist forces off their guard.” The evidence for Reisel’s contention was found by information gleaned from intelligence sources in Thailand and India regarding joint Sino-Soviet activities in the Chinese province of Sinkiang. Riesel stated that “There the Chinese Communists with the help of Russian technicians, Russian money and Russian material, are building a complex of  roads, factories, power plants, power lines connecting Khrushchev’s Russia and Mao Tse Tung’s China, railroads, research centers, bomb sites, islands of industrialization, and modern cities. There the Russians created a physicist’s city to help the joint efforts. There the Chinese and Soviets are exploiting huge uranium deposits.”[18] US Army Major General T.A. Lane (Retired) also expressed concerns in a January 20, 1965 editorial that the Sino Soviet split was an “opiate” to deceive the West. General Lane explained the rationale behind the joint Chinese-Soviet deception strategy: “It exploits the bourgeois faith in the status quo and reluctance to face reality. It employs the discipline and flexibility of communist organization…The communists, emerging from a very inferior power position and facing a long climb to parity with the democracies, needed a deception plan which would support continuous attack without ever alerting the defenses of the West. It would not do to grab a few gains and then face unyielding hostility, as Stalin did with Truman after Potsdam. The answer was the Jekyll and Hyde routine. While Mao pursued his course of terror and aggression, Khrushchev would wear the mask of the deviation who would ‘reason’ with the bourgeois leaders. This double image would keep the free world from focusing on the true nature and purposes of communism. It would cater to the bourgeois preconception that communist purposes could be moderated by cooperation to reach accommodation with the free world. It would provide an opiate to soothe the victim through the sequence of disasters which would attend his declining power.”[19]  Amazingly, this analysis as stated by General Lane echoed Golitsyn’s thesis of the scissors strategy almost verbatim twenty one years before New Lies for Old was written. General Lane explained this on the backdrop of the West’s misguided propensity to “reason” with their communist enemies.

Republican Presidential Candidate Ronald Reagan noted in an interview that: “They (USSR and China) were allies and the only argument that caused their split was an argument over how to best destroy us.” Reagan was then asked if elected, would his administration support the sale of weapons to Communist China: “No, because…they could turn right around and the day after tomorrow discover that they and the Soviets have more in common than they have with us.”[20] After Reagan become president in 1981, he appointed many holdovers from the Nixon-Ford Administrations who firmly clung to the view that China represented a strategic partner that could be utilized against the Soviet Union. Sadly, the president’s realistic assessments of the true nature of Sino-Soviet relations were cast aside with the ascension of the pro-détente elements and disciples of Henry Kissinger in the State Department and White House staff. During the 1980s, there were elements who analyzed the actual trends in Sino-Soviet relations. These individuals found that below the surface, interactions between the PRC and USSR were becoming more frequent, while China’s foreign policy frequently diverged from Western interests. Echoing former President Reagan’s 1980 campaign assertions, some foreign observers warned that the Soviets and Chinese would join in a common cause against Western capitalism. In an article dated from 1986, former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline noted that “The PRC has opposed almost every American foreign policy position adopted since he (Deng) came to power. Deng recently sent Vice-Premier Li Peng, educated in Moscow, to see Mikhail Gorbachev to urge improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, as he said, between "the two great neighbors and socialist countries." Li assured Gorbachev that, contacts with the United States notwithstanding, Peking "is not aligned with, nor does it establish strategic relations with other countries." In other words, the Pentagon myth of strategic benefits from improving relations with Peking is just a fantasy.”[21] Dr. Ku Cheng Kang of the World Anti-Communist League noted that: “The Soviet Union and Red China are attempting to form a new united front for world communization…the two communist regimes share the identical world communization goal and that free nations should pay serious attention to the possibility of Moscow Peiping rejoining for expansionist advances hand in hand…Free nations must abandon the mistaken and dangerous tactics of ‘working with some communists in an attempt to check some others.’”[22] French Sinologist Jacques Guilleme Brulon noted in 1985 that: “The present reforms as carried out by the Teng Hsiao-Ping Faction on the China Mainland is no more than the "New Economic Policy" as having being introduced by Lenin when the Soviet Union faced immense difficulties in the 1920S…In fact, like the Soviet Union, Communist China is only utilizing the collaboration of the West to build up its strength in order to destroy the West eventually.”[23]

The voices of concern continued during the period of the open rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China during the period 1989-1991. These analysts were concerned that the two communist powers were drawing together in a world that was seen to be democratizing rapidly. During the process of open rapprochement between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties in 1989, columnist William Safire noted that “For free nations, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement is not a net plus. We should stop smiling bravely and pretending that our hand is stronger without the China card in it.” Safire also noted that this rapprochement would also help lead to Korean re-unification under communist domination and would allow the Soviets to reallocate troops from the Far East to Eastern Europe to further threaten the NATO alliance. Safire concluded by stating: “By all rational standards, the Sino-Soviet summit meeting is a historic advance for communist leaders in both countries and a setback for freedom -- unless it leads to communism's crack-up. Only in that unlikely case would it not be detrimental to our interests.”[24] Former Soviet economic advisor to Gorbachev and defector Yuri Maltsev noted in 1991 that "The Soviet Union and China are now major allies because they are the only major communist regimes left in the world, apart from countries like Cuba and Albania. Mr. Bessmertnykh's (Foreign Minister) visit is very significant. I believe we will see relations between them going back to the close harmony they enjoyed before the great split of 1958. . . . They have a lot in common." Former CIA official Herb Meyer noted that: “They are natural allies; they need each other. They are the two lawless states left in the world. They've got nothing left now but one another." Former CIA Director and Defense Secretary noted James Schlesinger stated: “The Soviets and Chinese are getting mutual comfort from their good relations. They live in a world that is more dominated by the United States than either of them are comfortable with. Neither government really approved of U.S. activities in the Gulf. It's a way of attempting to regain their influence.”[25]

Continued Sino-Soviet Relations During the Maoist Era (1960-1976)

Despite the well publicized ideological differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties commencing in 1960, close relations continued between Beijing and Moscow. Collaboration continued on the military, ideological, and economic fronts. During the bona fide split between Tito and Stalin (1948-1953), collaboration of any type would be non-existent. However, Sino Soviet cooperation continued after 1960. This state of affairs begs the question as to: how deep was the split and was it legitimate to begin with? Would two enemies still supply military equipment, important economic assistance, and pronounce ideological solidarity with each other? These are the questions that historians and policy makers needed to heed when analyzing the truthfulness of the Sino-Soviet split and formulating Western policies as a result of this supposed change in relations with the two communist giants.

 In 1961, the Chinese newspaper People’s Daily praised the USSR for resuming nuclear bomb tests as a “step for peace.”[26] In 1961, Soviet Marshal Rodion Malinovsky hailed the close ties between the Soviet Army and the Chinese PLA. He called for the continued alliance of the two armies “in the interest of defending the security of our two countries.”[27] China also backed the East Germans in their position on the status of Berlin. Marshal Ho Lung stated to the East Germans that “the whole of the 650,000,000 people of China stand on your side.” Marshal Ho also added that an attack on East Germany “is an attack on the whole Socialist camp.”[28] Soviet Marshal Rodion Malinovsky sent greetings to Chinese PLA Marshal Lin Biao in August 1964.[29] According to a SIPRI study, the USSR shipped weapons for the Chinese Armed Forces after 1960. Military hardware shipped to China from the USSR after 1960 included IL-18 transport planes, MIG 21 fighters, SS C-2b coastal defense missiles, SS-N-2 Styx naval missiles, Komar fast attack craft, Osa I Class missile boats, Romeo class submarines, SA-2 SAMs, P-6 fast attack craft, Golf and Whiskey class submarines, and T-43 Class minesweepers.[30] The Times of London reported in 1976 that the PRC also utilized precision equipment from Czechoslovakia and East Germany to assist in the construction in their atomic bomb programs of the 1960s and 1970s.[31] When Swiss businessmen were being pursued for their illegal shipments of cobalt to China, they fled to Eastern European countries. The shipments of cobalt were destined for China’s nuclear bomb program and the material was shipped through Germany and Czechoslovakia and then onto the PRC. It should be noted that cobalt in atomic bombs would serve to greatly enhance the firepower and destructive capacity of such weapons. Despite the split, it is interesting to observe that such collaborators with China found it comfortably convenient to use Eastern European countries as conduits for the transferring of sensitive atomic bomb technology and materials to China.[32] The Chinese were also still considered potential recipients for Soviet made missiles well after the official split of 1960. A North Korean Colonel noted in 1963 that: “ the Soviet Union has powerful missiles, that probably these missiles are also stationed in the Far East, but it would be better and quieter if the Soviet Union gave such missiles to the DPRK and to the Chinese.”[33] National security scholar Dr. Joseph D. Douglass noted in an essay on POW-MIA affairs that the CSSR proposed cooperation with China on medical experimentation on US POWs captured during the Vietnam War: “…a senior Czech military intelligence officer who was undercover in China as a military attaché reported on a Chinese request to share information on continued medical test programs. The Chinese official complained to the Czech ‘attaché’ that eve n if there were developing antagonisms between their two countries, some cooperative activities should continue, for example, he suggested, the joint research on American POWs. We are continuing this research, he said, and asked, why don't we continue to share results of this research? There is no reason to keep your program secret. We know the American POWs are being sent to the Soviet Union for research. Information exchange on these research programs would be of use to both our countries."[34] It was believed by columnist Henry J. Taylor that the Soviets and Chinese cooperated through North Korea in masterminding the hijacking of the Pueblo. He noted that “Moscow-Peking ideological differences notwithstanding, the intelligence coordination continues between the Soviets and the Teh Wu in Peking and Pyongyang. Washington keeps our public ignorant of this by our officials’ Soviet cover-up policy, which is a systemized public relations pitch to make it appear to our public that by Washington’s statesmanship our relations with the USSR have improved.”[35]

While the trade relations between Moscow and Beijing were greatly reduced by the mid 1960s, it can also be reasonably argued that such trade became more specialized. The Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union still provided items that assisted the continuance of China’s industrial base. It is also significant to note that goods such as chemicals, no-ferrous ores, machinery, machine tools, and passenger aircraft all have military war fighting or production applications in one form or another. The PRC and East Germany (GDR) signed a trade agreement in 1962, where the GDR would provide industrial machinery in exchange for Chinese minerals, food, textiles, chemicals, and light industrial products.[36] China also signed a trade agreement in 1962 with the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev representing the USSR’s economic mission.[37] China concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1964, where Moscow would supply Peking with tractors, petroleum products, trucks, industrial chemicals, and IL-18 transport planes.[38] In the same year, the value of imports from the Soviet bloc states in Europe could be broken down to: East Germany $3.3 million; Poland $25.5 million; Hungary $20 million; Czechoslovakia $33 million.[39] In 1965, the Soviets and Chinese concluded a trade agreement, where the USSR would supply the PRC with machine tools, passenger planes, helicopters, vehicles, tractors, metals, lumber, chemicals, and industrial equipment. China was to supply garments, silk, apples, citrus fruits, shoes, pork, chemicals, nonferrous metals, and livestock products.[40] In 1966, the Soviets and Chinese signed a trade agreement for the exchange of goods.[41] In 1968, Soviet exports to China amounted to $53 million while PRC imports to the USSR totaled $33 million.[42] The PRC and Czechoslovakia (CSSR) signed a trade agreement, where the CSSR would ship the Chinese machines, marine engines, trucks, and ball bearings. The Chinese would in turn ship to the Czechs meats, textiles, metal alloys, and plant and animal products.[43] In 1969, trade between the USSR and the PRC totaled $55 million.[44] In 1970, Soviet Deputy Trade Minister Vladimir Alkhimov stated that Soviet exports to China totaled $46 million.[45] Also, in that year, Soviet Deputy Trade Minister Ivan Grishin conferred with Chinese Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade Li Chiang to discuss economic relations. The PRC also conveyed greetings on the 53rd Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1970. Their message stated a more muted, yet existent friendly relationship between the USSR and China: “Differences of principle must not hinder the maintenance and development of normal state relations between two countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence.”[46]  In 1972, China received two IL-62 airliners from the Soviets, as a result of a trade agreement concluded in 1970.[47] Trade in 1972 between the USSR and China totaled $290.4 million and consisted of turbine generators, trucks, helicopters, airplane spare parts, lathes, cars, tractors, and machinery spare parts. The Soviets imported from China non-ferrous metals, high grade ores, fuel derived from animal fats, fruit, knitwear, furs, yard-goods, and vacuum flasks.[48] China also established a 500 square meter pavilion at the Brno Trade Fair in the CSSR (Czechoslovakia) in 1972 to further enhance trade between the communist states.[49] In 1975, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Chen Chieh left the PRC to fly to Moscow to sign a trade and payments agreement.[50]

China also found itself continuing to cooperate with Soviet satellites and allies in the Third World in the early 1960s. This cooperation was predicated on the common goal of the weakening and the destruction of imperialism and capitalism worldwide. In 1960, it was reported that at least thirty Chinese military advisers were operating MIG jets, anti-aircraft guns, and providing instruction to Cuban Army and Militia forces.[51] Anti-communist president Miguel Ydigoras of Guatemala alleged that anti-Castro liberation troops captured at the Bay of Pigs were tortured by Chinese military personnel. He also alleged that Chinese tank crews were manning Soviet built T-34 tanks in Cuba in battles against anti-communist freedom fighters.[52] Peking was also reported to be involved in efforts to extract funds from ethnic Chinese residing in Cuba.[53] Former Cuban Army Captain Angel Saavedra Correa reported that Cuban intelligence (G-2) agents serving undercover at their Embassy in Washington DC passed data collected by espionage against the United States to both the Soviets and Chinese. He served as the Cuban Embassy’s Air and Military Attaché until his defection in early 1960.[54] In 1966, it was reported that Cuban ships were involved in picking up weapons in Chinese ports and shipping them to their mutual ally, North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam-DRV).[55] US Assistant Commissioner of Narcotics Charles Siragusa noted in 1962 that the Chinese were shipping opium through Cuba to the United States to demoralize the American youth and obtain hard currency for their coffers.[56]

Despite the supposed split between China and the USSR, both nations supplied war materials to the North Vietnamese (DRV). China also allowed its territory and infrastructure to be utilized for the transportation of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons to the DRV. In April 1965, it was reported that the Chinese ceased erecting obstacles to the Soviets transshipping missiles and other weapons through the PRC to the DRV.[57] During the American naval blockade of DRV ports, China allowed the Soviets to ship war material via their rail networks to North Vietnam. A DRV delegation consisting of Brig. Phan Trong, the Minister of Communications, and Ly Bay, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade traveled to China to coordinate the joint PRC-Soviet deliveries.[58] Sinologist and Professor David N. Rowe noted in testimony to the National Committee to Restore Internal Security (November 1981) that the Soviets and the Chinese were on the same side in providing weapons, oil, and troops to assist the DRV. He summarized the coalescence of the interests of Moscow and Beijing during the Vietnam War by stating: “…when it comes down to facing up to a mutual enemy, the United States, they (USSR and China) don’t feud; they cooperate, and they will continue to do so in my opinion.”[59] In 1972, it was reported that two East German freighters were loaded with supplies and heavy trucks for the DRV at the Chinese port of Whampoa.[60]

China was also involved with the GDR (East Germany), the Soviet Union, and the CSSR in training and equipping communist guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea. This assistance was funneled through the communist state of Guinea under the dictatorship of President Sekou Toure.[61] The Chinese also sent advisers to the communist state of Ghana under the dictatorial president Kwame Nkrumah. Col. Yen Leng set up a training camp in Ghana, alongside East German Ministry of State Security (Stasi) and Soviet personnel. These camps trained Ghanian agents and African leftists whose ultimate aim was a Socialist United Africa under one “Continental Union Government.”[62]  In the 1960s and 1970s, China trained various Palestinian terrorists fighting against Israel. Many were trained at the Whampoa Military Academy and by instructors in pro-Soviet nations such as Syria and Algeria. It was reported that during 1966-1967, 185 Chinese PLA officers were training officers of the Syrian Army. The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) received Chinese copies of the Soviet AK-47, artillery, poison gas, decontamination equipment, portable copies of the Blowpipe surface to air missiles (SAMs), and 81 mm mortars through Egypt. Other arms were shipped through Arab ports and cached in Egypt.[63] 

China during the 1960s and early 1970s continued to denounce US and NATO economic and security policies in Europe. For example, the PRC quoted French attacks on the NATO alliance with approval and saw the Common Market as smaller nations banding together to stand up to the larger powers.[64] In 1969, Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang met with diplomats at the Soviet Embassy in Peking to celebrate the 52nd Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Over four hundred persons, including 50 Chinese, were present at this reception[65] In September 1971, the USSR made it clear that they opposed the original US plan for the two China plan of admitting Taiwan and the PRC to the UN. Pravda noted “Of great significance in raising the effectiveness and authority of the United Nations would be achievement of a genuine universality. This would be fostered by the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Chinese People’s Republic in the United Nations and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shekists.”[66] In October 1971, Soviet UN Ambassador Yakov Malik noted that the two China policy was an “unsavory policy intended to sever Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China.” Malik added that the US tried to “frighten the members of  the United Nations” by opposing the expulsion of the Taiwanese. Malik stated that the US position was also “absurd inventions and ridiculous fairy tales composed for children of preschool age.”[67]  In 1971, the Soviets voted for China’s admission into the UN and the ejection of Taiwan.  Izvestia noted that the admission of the PRC to the UN was a “triumph for common sense.” Izvestia further noted that “Through all the general Assembly session at which the question of restoring the rights of China was debated, the position of the Soviet Union remained principles constant and unchanged. No matter how our relations with the Chinese leader evolved-as is known they have deteriorated through no fault of our own-the Soviet Union, true to the internationalist  principles of its Leninist foreign policy always proceeded from the fact that the Chinese people could not be ignored and had to be represented in the United Nations.”[68] In November 1971, the head of China’s UN delegation Chiao Kuan-hua was a guest at the Soviet Embassy in a reception to celebrate the Bolshevik Revolution. Chiao met with Soviet Ambassador Vasily Tolstikov.[69]

Trust Redux: Revisiting the Lin Biao Incident

National security analyst Jeffrey Nyquist raised the possibility that the border war between China and the Soviet Union and the crash of alleged plotter PLA Gen. Lin Biao were allegedly staged provocations. Nyquist noted “In 1971 a strange bit of intelligence appeared in the West. The head of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Gen. Lin Biao (Mao's chosen successor), had supposedly formed a secret liaison with the Soviet General Staff in order to stage (of all things) a phony border war. One source later reported that this phony war would involve the actual destruction of two Russian regiments and four Chinese regiments.  How did the Americans hear of this? There is no way to be sure, but it seems that U.S. intelligence may have penetrated the Chinese General Staff in the first half of 1971. Henry Kissinger states in his memoirs: "...on July 2 the Chinese sent up two MiG-19s in an apparently premeditated attempt to intercept and possibly shoot down a C-130 flying an intelligence mission one hundred miles off the Chinese coast." On the eve of Kissinger's groundbreaking 1971 trip to China, Beijing was trying to shoot down U.S. aircraft -- the first such attempt in six years! Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon, calling the Chinese action "puzzling and even disturbing." Why would the Chinese jeopardize his mission to China? Why would they risk a confrontation when a new era was about to begin?  Perhaps that C-130 was about to make contact with an American agent within the Chinese General Staff. Perhaps that agent was about to report that the Sino-Soviet split was a fabrication, that the border war between Russia and China was "contrived." Then came another piece of the puzzle. On 27 November 1971 the Washington Post sported the following curious headline: "Lin Biao Believed To Be Dead." A British-built Trident airliner belonging to China had crashed in Mongolia on Sept. 12, 1971. Gen. Lin was supposedly on the plane. Several months later the Chinese government released its official report on Lin Biao's death. The report asserted that Gen. Lin was killed while fleeing to the Soviet Union. He had attempted to overthrow Chairman Mao.  But the official report was a lie. According to Col. Stanislav Lunev, formerly with the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff, everyone on Lin's Biao's plane had been killed long before the plane took off. After flying the corpse-filled aircraft across the Mongolian border, the Chinese pilot parachuted out and walked back to China. In other words, the crash was staged. Obviously, the staged crash of Gen. Lin's plane wasn't meant to fool Moscow. Rather, it was something for the Americans, just like the phony border war that Lin had been arranging. But Chinese intelligence could not let the American's put two and two together. Chinese sources quickly emerged, offering a new twist to the story. According to these sources Lin Biao's attempt at a contrived border war had nothing to do with the "genuine" border wars of 1969-70. Lin's phony war with Russia was nothing more than a device for overthrowing Chairman Mao. There was no secret Chinese-Russian collusion. America could rest assured that the Sino-Soviet split was genuine.[70] Additional questions that to be posed in the public discussion are: 1) in such a tightly controlled society of China, Mao would certainly be aware of Gen. Lin’s long time liaisons with the Soviets which supposedly predated the alleged plot of 1971. Why was this long term relationship between Gen. Lin and the Soviet General Staff allowed to exist in the first place for so many years before 1971? 2) Since the incident described above was an alleged Soviet plot, why would the Chinese pilot of Gen. Lin’s plane walk back to China and not to the USSR to seek refuge? If it was a bona fide plot, the pilot would have fled to the Soviet Union to escape certain execution by the Maoist authorities. Authorities needed to consider the possibility of the incident of Gen. Lin’s plot and plane crash as a well choreographed version of deceptive theater to misinform the West and the seal the veracity of the alleged Sino-Soviet split in the eyes of the capitalist world. The USSR had experience in creating fake resistance armies in the Soviet Trust and the Polish “anti-communist” WIN organizations. It is known that the Trust and WIN groups even staged fake battles with the communist authorities to greatly enhance their credibility in the eyes of Western policymakers and intelligence analysts. One purpose in the organization of these fake resistance groups by communist authorities was to provide the appearance to Western intelligence that communism was weakening and collapsing. Such a strategy was carried out in line with the ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu’s dictum that: “All warfare is based on deception. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline. Simulated weakness postulates strength.”[71] According to Golitsyn, Sun Tzu was required reading at the military and intelligence academies in communist countries such as East Germany, the Soviet Union, and China.[72]

“Opening to the United States?” Scissors Strategy At Work

            During the early 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party initiated an “opening” to the United States. In classic Leninist fashion, Mao believed that communists should utilize internal disunity within the capitalist camp to the advantage of the revolutionary movement. Disunity within a capitalist country or alliance of nations causes weaknesses in that camp, thus paving the way for potential communist world domination. Disunity within the Free World also allows the communist Chinese to gain strength on the economic and military fronts. This strategy was also based on the deception advice of Sun Tzu written in the Art of War. In a article titled “Powerful Weapon to Unite the People and Defeat the Enemy” (1971) Mao pointed out that “Our policy is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one…The united front is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle.”[73] Chou En-lai, in his Report on the International Situation given in December 1971 summarized the primary task of China’s foreign policy as “to promote war and further revolution.” He also noted that “It is necessary to properly deal with the American people. Chairman Mao said: “Place great hope in the people of the United States. As the people’s revolution in the US is gaining momentum gradually, we have to do more work.” Thus, Chou and Mao felt that the “opening” to the United States will set the stage for capitalism to be overthrown in the United States, which was also a shared Soviet goal. Chou also supported the use of divide and conquer as a means of exploiting contradictions within the enemy camp: “The normalization of relations makes it convenient to bolster the people’s revolution of those countries. That Lenin established relations with China’s northern warlords and simultaneously helped China’s revolution in a big way is an example. The peaceful co-existence of the Soviet revisionists is capitulationism; our peaceful coexistence is for the purpose of revolution. The problem of fully exploiting the contradictions and weaknesses of the enemy.  Lenin teaches us that we must discreetly, gingerly exploit all the contradictions and weaknesses of the enemy’s camp. This is both a strategy and a principle of revolution.”[74] Chou also noted in his March 1973 Report on the International Situation that: “We cannot propose to unite with the US to oppose the USSR though we share the same views with the US on certain issues.”[75] This is a significant quote by Chou, which admits that any alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union is highly undesirable from the standpoint of the PRC. It also indicated that the Chinese believed in the continuation of the USSR and kept the possibility of a renewed alliance with the Soviets open. A confidential directive of the Central Committee of the CCP of March 30, 1973 revealed the strategy of opening to the United States: “The visit of Nixon to China led to the announcement of a Sino-U.S. joint communiqué, in which both sides agreed to expand understanding between the two countries, to establish people-to-people contacts and exchanges in science, technology culture, sports, and the press. This is a matter of profound significance in going one step further to open up the gate of contacts between the people of China and the United States.... When Marxism-Leninism is integrated with the revolutionary practices of China, the Chinese revolution puts on a new look. Now our influences have reached the United States. If only we work with patience and enthusiasm, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought will definitely be integrated with the practices of the revolutionary movement in the United States, thereby speeding up the process of revolution in the United States.... Our invitation to Nixon to visit China proceeds precisely from Chairman Mao's tactical thinking: "exploring contradiction, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and destroying them one by one." And this by no means indicated a change in our diplomatic line.... We agreed to Nixon's tour of China in order that on the one hand we could curb the collusion between the United States and the Soviet Union, weaken their strength, and keep them from taking reckless and impetuous actions to start a war. On the other hand, we use peace talks as a means of forcing U.S. imperialism, now beset with difficulties, at home and abroad, to withdraw its forces from Indochina, Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, of propelling a peaceful settlement of the questions of Taiwan, Indochina, Vietnam, and of alleviating the tension in Asia and other parts of the world.... The visit of Nixon to China was bitterly condemned by the Chiang gang as a "perfidious and unrighteous act" of U.S. imperialism. A meeting was held to discuss the question of neutralization of Southeast Asia by the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.... Contradictions between Japan and the United States were unprecedently sharpened.... This state of affairs benefits our work and the people's revolution.... The Shanghai Communiqué released during the visit of Nixon to China has forced U.S. imperialism to take cognizance of the fact that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory and that the ultimate objective is the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. This keeps U.S. imperialism from making a further intervention in Taiwan. Simultaneously with improvement in the Sino-U.S. relations, there will arise a gradual alienation in the relations between the United States and the Chiang gang. This is beneficial to our settlement of the Taiwan question without foreign intervention.... Comrades, the present improvement in the Sino-U.S. relations does not mean that the Taiwan question can be settled immediately. We must see that the liberation of Taiwan is a complex struggle. On the question of liberating Taiwan there exist two possibilities: liberation by peaceful means and liberation by force of arms. At present, U.S. imperialism has not yet withdrawn its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and the Chiang gang is still doing its utmost to repress the demands of those advocating peace talks with us. We definitely must not pin out hope on a peaceful liberation. Our Army must particularly step up preparations for war and be ready at all times to liberate Taiwan by force of arms.”[76] Once again, the Chinese Communists were using the “opening” to the United States as a means of acquiring needed technology, detaching and isolating the Americans from their allies in Asia. Hence, it hastens the path to communism within the United States and Asia. Deng Xiaoping noted in a speech on July 20, 1977 (Third Plenary Session of the 10th Congress of the CCP) that: “In the international united front struggle the most important strategy is unification as well as struggle.  That is to say, to obtain unification through struggle and to develop struggle through unification. Isn’t this a form of contradiction? Actually, it is not. This is Mao Tse Tung’s great discovery which has unlimited power. Even though the American imperialists can be said to be number one nation in scientific and technical matters, she knows absolutely nothing in this area. In the future she will have no way of avoiding defeat by our hands…We belong to the Marxist Camp and can never be so thoughtless that we cannot distinguish friends from enemies. Nixon, Ford, Carter, and future American imperialistic leaders all fall into this category (enemies). They want to use the split between us and the USSR to destroy the world socialist system in order to manipulate and lessen the Soviet threat toward themselves. Why can’t we take advantage of the contradiction and grudge that exists between them and initiate actions that would be favorable to our national policy?  We must control others and cannot allow others to control us. We cannot be our master if we overly rely on others and do not take the initiative. This will definitely not happen to us. We must seize all opportunities to acquire things that we need under conditions set forth by us. What we need mainly is scientific and technical knowledge and equipment. This would contribute the most to our modernization plans. At the same time, improvement in China USA relations is inevitable and as and as this relationship develops the American imperialists will defer to our wishes. Once normalization between China and the USA is finalized it will naturally be beneficial to us in resolving the problem of liberating Taiwan. After that the sources of all of our internal problems will vanish and even the confused and complicated issues of Tibet and Sinkiang will also be resolved. Many American imperialists have been rushing to our country, including two Presidents, two Secretaries of State, Congressman, and also other influential military and political figures. Even Vance can hardly wait to visit us next month.[77] Deng’s speech illustrates a continuation Mao’s policy of utilizing contradictions for the benefits of communism. He also highlighted the importance of US technology in building up communist power in Beijing and his allegiance to the “Marxist Camp.” Deng was also cognizant of the misguided Western attempt to utilize the “China Card” to the detriment to communist unity. Most significantly, Deng professed his unequivocal loyalty to the socialist-communist community and not to any alliance with the United States.

Keng Piao, member of the Central Committee of the CCP and Chief of the Foreign Liaison Department, gave a speech to the graduating class of the Institute of Diplomacy on August 24, 1976. Keng stated: ”The USA still practices capitalism within her own country but continues to expand her military preparations for war and the nuclear arms race….Although USA military might has weakened compared to the past and her activities have been somewhat reduced the USA natural instinct for aggression has not changed. Because of this and based on our principles, the focus of our struggle should not only focus our struggle on Soviet revisionists we must also continue to focus on the USA. We now seldom use the USA imperialist terminology and only on occasion accuse them of being one of the two mighty rulers. Does this mean we have abandoned the basic principles of Marxism Leninism or that we are no longer opposed to imperialism and colonialism?...The Soviet revisionists and the American imperialists will forever remain the source from which war will originate. Under the present international conditions, this is now a reality that will not change. Certain advocates of indiscrimination and adventurism have too narrow a view of the US relationship. They do not have an accurate understanding of the two faces of the US ruling class. They only see the reactionary side, which strongly advocates struggle. They fall to see the soft and weak side which can be exploited. They fail to see the possibility to struggle against these weaknesses and take advantage of them. Regardless of how we look at things, we must have an accurate and positive concept of US policy. This means: First, the USA is still and imperialist nation…We will wait until the day that we think the opportunity is ripe and then issue a sincere notice for Uncle Sam to pack up and get out.”[78] One of the most significant points of Keng’s speech was his adherence to a flexible view of the political and economic elites in the United States. He felt that these internal class contradictions are silent, but deadly weapons that can be exploited to the benefit of international communism. On July 30, 1977 Foreign Minister Huang Hua gave a speech to an audience consisting of Central Committee members, military officers, high diplomatic authorities, and foreign trade officials. He stated: “Tito’s visit represents the flexibility that is needed in our strategy and is not any way a form of political bartering. Although minor differences exist between our two nations we still have a common goal. We do this to achieve our objectives…During the next few years, our country will enter a period of major construction and there are many advanced scientific techniques and scientific management experiences we need to learn from the USA. We must purchase various types of precision and scientific equipment from the USA. We must, through other exchange methods, obtain more data on industries, construction and scientific and research techniques….The USA has a large labor production force, and a strong dormant revolutionary strength. Through association, we can plant the seeds of Marxism Leninism and Maoism in the United States and let them sprout roots and grow big.”[79] Huang’s speech was consistent with the viewpoints of Deng, Mao, and Chou in their Leninist style utilization of Western technology to build up China’s power. The above mentioned quotes clearly illustrated Golitsyn’s discussion concerning the benefits accrued to Beijing as a result of the alleged false PRC-USSR split and the scissors strategy. The flow of Western and especially US technology became a steady flood as a result of Sino-Soviet differences.

Some of China’s communist allies praised Mao’s “opening” to the United States. They saw that the “opening” to the United States and former President Nixon’s visit to the PRC as a sign of acceptance, surrender, and weakness in the face of communism. Thus, the credibility of Mao and the international communist camp was greatly enhanced in the eyes of Western public opinion to the detriment of the capitalist class. North Korea’s Kim Il Sung hailed such a step as “the hostile policy towards China has eventually gone into complete bankruptcy. Nixon’s visit to China will not be a march of a victor but a trip of the defeated and it fully reflects the destiny of United States imperialism, which is like a sun sinking into Western sky.”[80] Kim added: “This is a great victory of the Chinese people and a victory for the world revolutionary people. . .The confusion created among the U.S. ruling class and its allies and puppets in connection with the trip reflects the serious unrest in the imperialist camp, who see the sun sinking in the Western sky. . .”[81]

NEP in China During the Era of Deng Xiaoping

The so called “reforms” of Deng Xiaoping and successive CCP rulers were based on Lenin’s NEP in the Soviet Union during the 1920s. Lenin sought to utilize the techniques, management styles, market mechanisms, and technology to revitalize communism in the USSR in the period 1921-1924. Deng and his Party theorists explicitly borrowed from the Leninist experience of using capitalism to build socialist totalitarianism in the Soviet Union. Articles in the Chinese Communist Party press clearly cite Lenin as a source of inspiration for the so called “reforms” in China. Most high level US policymakers failed to comprehend that these “reforms” were actual long term strategies of Soviet origin to make communism more efficient and productive. It is certainly plausible to reason that a wealthier, more productive communist state is a greater threat to the West than one that is poorer and weaker. The Vice President of Shenzhen University Fang Shen noted in a September 1985 article in the People’s Daily the Leninist heritage of the reforms of the 1980s: “As to the second distinction, whether a socialist country should make use of capitalism or not is a question which has long been resolved both in theory and in practice. It is of even greater importance for an economically backward socialist country to solve the question correctly. In the light of the difficulties facing Russia in those years, Lenin once penetratingly pointed out that how socialism was realized was determined by how successfully Soviet political power and administrative organs were integrated with the most advanced things of capitalism. Here Lenin creatively put forward the theoretical viewpoint of making use of capitalism to build socialism. The so-called making use of capitalism includes, the use of foreign capital, the import of advanced technology, experience in scientific management and talented people specialising in various fields, the sending of personnel abroad for further study, and learning some forms and methods of contemporary bourgeois economics which can be used by us. Among these are the valuable wealth created by man which can be commonly shared by mankind, rich experience for developing production accumulated by capitalism over a long period, and effective ways for meeting the needs of socialized production on a large scale. All these can be used by socialist countries and should not be avoided as taboo.”[82]

Another writer for the People’s Daily Li Honglin noted in a 1984 article that: “After the October revolution, Lenin also considered carrying out economic co-operation with foreign countries through the "lease system" and other ways. But he died too early. Later, Stalin mainly considered the problem as one of "building socialism in a country surrounded by the capitalist countries".Although he also strove to import foreign things to speed up the construction in his country, he never put forth the question of opening to the outside world either in theory or in principle.”[83] Hua Guodong noted in an article in Ban Yue Tan that: “As a matter of fact, this is a kind of misunderstanding. A socialist country not only can, but also should, open up to capitalist countries in a manner advantageous to itself. In the early period of the founding of the Soviet Union, Lenin said: "How can we accelerate economic development when our country is economically still extremely weak? This means we must make use of bourgeois capital." He also said: "How to bring about socialism depends on the manner in which we integrate the Soviet government and Soviet administrative structure with the latest progressive things of capitalism." During the periods under Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Union made use of foreign funds to engage foreign scientists and engineers and build numerous major projects. From this we can see that the carrying out of certain forms of alliance between a socialist country and foreign capital is not in violation of Marxism-Leninism in principle and is advantageous in practice.”[84]

One of the “reform” measures Deng initiated in the PRC were the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) modeled after Lenin’s concessions for foreign businessmen in early 1920s investing in the Soviet Union. SEZ provided a whole host of benefits to foreign businesses investing in certain coastal Chinese cities. The activities of foreign enterprises were naturally monitored by the state and the Chinese Communist Party. In an article on SEZs in China, author Xu Dixin noted that “What is the nature of the economy in the special zones? This is a question every- one concerns himself with. According to the present situation there, there is some socialist s1ate-run and collective economy as well as individual economy, but the greater proportion is national capitalist economy, namely, the foreign and overseas Chinese capital cooperating with our country. The processing of goods for foreign customers, compensation trade and joint ventures with or without joint capital at present are all national capitalist economy. From an isolated point of view the enterprises run solely by foreign or overseas Chinese capital are capitalist ones. But these enterprises should not be viewed in isolation, because their activities are under the management and restriction of the government of the special zones. This is why they also have the nature of national capitalism. As Lenin clearly pointed out: "National capitalism is capitalism whose activities we can restrict and limit." This theoretically solves for us the problem of the nature of the enterprises solely owned by external capital. This proves that the economy of the special zones is national capitalist in nature.”[85]

In 1982, an article in the publication Red Flag opined that “After the October Revolution, Lenin advocated the implementation of the concession system. At that time, since the Soviet Union was in great difficulties, the enterprises under the concession system amounted to more than 200, and tens of millions of roubles of foreign capital was drawn into the Soviet Union. At that time, Lenin was of the opinion that associating the Soviet Union with international capital was necessary. At the same time, he thought that there was a serious struggle in the course of associating with international capital and associating with international capital was aimed at promoting the socialist economic construction of the Soviet state. Today, we are continuing to act in accordance with Lenin's viewpoint. It is wrong to close the country to international exchange, to fight in isolation or to refuse to be associated with international capital. On the other hand, it is also wrong to neglect or abandon struggles during the process of associating with international capital. To put it in a nutshell, we should struggle while associating.”[86]

Capitalistic ideas from the West were to be harnessed by the Chinese Communists in accordance to Lenin’s guidance: “We all know very well the attitude of the teachers of the revolutionary proletariat towards the bourgeoisie's classical economics and sciences. They made a strict distinction between the vulgar bourgeois economics and classic economics and fundamentally criticized the vulgar bourgeois economics. However, they conscientiously analyse the things which they can utilize and refer to. In his exposition of the question of how we shall deal with the contemporary bourgeois social science, Lenin pointed out: ''Open your eyes to see the bourgeois science, pay attention to it, and make use of it, approach it with criticism, and do not abandon our own integral and correct world outlook'' (''The Collected Works of Lenin'', Vol 3, footnote on page 581)…We must repudiate and criticize various kinds of ugly and decadent things, eliminate their effect and pernicious influence and assimilate in a selected way what is useful to us and subject it to a revolutionary reform in order to fight for the development of our Marxist economics and sciences and the acceleration of our socialist modernizations.”[87]

Various Soviet bloc delegations visited the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and there were some indications that Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Hu Qiamou all supported various levels of maintaining or expanding of relations with the USSR: The Shenzhen special economic zone has not only drawn the attention of the entire nation, but also produced worldwide reaction. Economic delegations from the Soviet Union, Hungary and Korea have visited Shenzhen. Kim Chong-il, son of Korean strong man Kim Il-sung, has also visited Shenzhen… Hu Qiaomu and Chen Yun hold identical views with regard to China's policy towards the Soviet Union. Hu Qiaomu formally suggested an early improvement of Sino- Soviet relations. But Deng Xiaoping maintained that China should keep the Soviet Union at a certain distance while improving relations with it. He is resolutely opposed to taking the Soviet road.”[88] The overseas edition of Renmin Ribao noted in March 1987 that “Lenin also stressed that capitalist society prepared many ready made things for socialism. He said ‘Capitalism has established some statistics organs such as banks, syndicates, post offices, consumer cooperatives, federations of staff members, and so on. Without a large bank, it is impossible to realize socialism.’ He added ‘We should regard it as a ready thing and snatch it from capitalism. Our task in this regard is to cut off things that capitalism uses to vilify this wonderful organ so that it will become a large, more democratic, and all embracing organ…(Lenin als stated) Without making use of the technical and cultural achievements of large scale capitalism, it will be impossible to realize socialism. Without capitalist cultural heritage, we cannot build socialism. We cannot use things other than those left over to us by capitalism to build communism.[89]

Open Healing of Sino-Soviet Relations 1980-1987

After Mao’s death in 1976, open displays of friendliness and solidarity increased between the Soviets, Warsaw Pact, and China. Both Chinese and Soviet newspapers and media outlets took note of these professions of friendship and trade between the two powers increased. The Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po noted in 1983 that “there has been a trend for relations between China and pro-Soviet countries to get gradually warmer.”[90] A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in the same year noted that “even in the most complicated periods, the CPSU and the Soviet government have never forgotten that the long range and fundamental interests of the Soviet Union and China are identical.”[91]  No doubt these identical, fundamental interests of the USSR and China were the communization of the globe. In 1984, North Korean President Kim Il Sung and SED Chairman Erich Honecker had a formerly classified discussion concerning foreign policies. It appears that this conversation provided proof that the Chinese opening to the United States was an effort to absorb massive amounts of technology and the rhetoric mentioning Soviet revisionism was either deceptive balderdash or vastly overstating by Western policy making elites. The North Korean dictator expressed that “Given the complex world situation, I hope that the Soviet Union and China work things out. I believe that the development of relations with the US is not targeted against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai already told me that when they established relations with the US. They told us every time they met with Japan and the US. The only objective of these relations is to obtain developed technology and credit from Japan and the US. Deng Xiaoping is said to have stated in the US that the arms build-up in the US is good for peace. I don’t know if that’s so. This is the first time I have heard of Deng Xiaoping expressing a sentiment like that."[92] In a 1984 meeting with former President Reagan, Deng and Zhao Ziyang noted that “the United States had seriously offended others in supporting the four ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’ in the world (namely Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, and South Africa) and voiced his hope that the United States would revise its policy. The United States still wants to support the ‘four unsinkable aircraft carriers.’”[93] The same article noted these observations concerning conversation between the Soviets and Chinese concerning their relationship: “When Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited the Soviet Union, Gromyko asked Qian privately: Does China truly believe the sweet words and honeyed phrases of the imperialists? Qian answered: China has been dealing with imperialists for more than 100 years, it clearly understands the essence of imperialism. Gromyko expressed his desire to develop relations between the Soviet Union and China. Qian said that the two countries could develop their economic relations. People notice that although Sino-Soviet relations are steadily improving, the Soviet Press has not eased its attacks on China. Why? There are two reasons for this: (1) Diverting the attention of the United States from the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations; (2) Quelling the desires of the East European countries to improve their relations with China.”[94] It is interesting to note that the anti-Soviet attacks in the Chinese press were considered by some to be a diversion or deception purposely attempting to obfuscate the growing, reconstituted ties between the USSR and China. As Golitsyn pointed out in New Lies for Old and Lunev’s revelations to Jeff Nyquist, the feigned disunity covered up a secret alliance between the two communist giants.

An unidentified Soviet official noted that China and the USSR had more in common on ideological and geopolitical grounds. He admitted that the two powers would draw closer together by virtue of these commonalities. The unnamed Soviet official noted: “‘The United States started out well with China and now you are losing. The pinnacle on American-Chinese relations was in 1980, and there will not be another such pinnacle. At first, China thought of the United States as a strategic partner. Now China believes the Soviet Union will not attack China.’ This official maintained that Peking would be the ally of neither Washington nor Moscow but would ‘use what it sees as the contradictions of Soviet socialism and American imperialism to foster the role of China as the main superpower of the future,’ with its base in the third world. He reasoned that Peking would continue to have anti-American positions on the Middle East, Africa and Central America and would side with Washington against Moscow on Afghanistan and Cambodia. But, he insisted, ‘the differences with Moscow on these issues are not permanent.’ ‘China is supporting the militaristic cause of the Reagan Administration in Europe,'' he continued, ''but will be forced to change this position also.’ He went on to say: ‘China, with all its peculiarities, is still a Communist country and the United States is an imperialist country. The Chinese are becoming more Communist internally, and they are convinced that imperialism will not help them build socialism. After having played the junior partner to imperialism, China is resuming its role of the third great power in the world.’ As he analyzed the situation, China ‘couldn't be an equal partner of America for a long time and tried to take command of you, but you wouldn't allow it.’ ‘So, having failed to create a unified front against the Soviet Union, they resumed their anti-superpower front’ he said. On the border talks, he conceded that the positions of the two sides ‘diverge substantially.’ But he contended that through a series of confidence-building measures under discussion, tensions could be further reduced. The Soviet approach, he said, was to try to set aside disputed treaties and ‘make corrections’ in the border.”[95]

The Soviets and Vietnamese made it known that they desired a reconstituted alliance with China. Such a partnership would consolidate and thereby strengthen communist power, thus placing pressure on the West and the rest of the non-communist world.  Radio Peace and Progress noted in 1985 that “Both the USSR and Vietnam have linked the task of improving their relations with the PRC with the task of developing their relations with all socialist countries. This shows the communists’ class strategy, which aims at further strengthening solidarity among all socialist forces in the world so that the anti-imperialist united front can be consolidated. Under the present circumstances, such solidarity is particularly essential.”[96]  A declassified transcript of a conversation between Bulgarian Communist dictator Todor Zhivkov and Chinese communist leaders Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping revealed that the communist “rivals” still adhered to a common goal. This goal was undoubtedly world communism. Zhivkov travelled to Beijing for this high level meeting with Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. When the topic of Chinese Soviet relations came up, Zhao stated: “As for China’s relations with other countries, I suppose that our relations with the Soviet Union are of interest to you. We are pursuing a complete normalization of our relations with the Soviet Union. We would like the relations between the two great neighboring socialist countries to be normalized as soon as possible. The whole world would benefit from this.” Zhivkov agreed, noting that “I most sincerely hope that a way to normalize the relations between China and the Soviet Union will be found. We share common aims and ideals.”[97] In another meeting that year Zhivkov and Deng noted that a common ideological alliance had been solidified:

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thus our attempts are directed at implementing the resolutions of the latest 13th Congress of our Party that was held last spring. We will be together in our common struggle side by side.
We share a common aim. We must make efforts together.
Despite all that happened to the relations between our two socialist countries, we are actually following the same path. This is what matters. All other problems can be solved by negotiating in a communist manner.”[98]

Continued Bloc-Chinese Military Relations 1977-1990

During the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese officials and generals held receptions at diplomatic missions in Beijing to celebrate the “army days” of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Despite the pretensions of a split, very friendly military exchanges occurred between the Bloc countries and the PRC. A peculiar aspect to these friendly celebrations between the communist military attaches and officials was the high level attention and respect that the Chinese gave to the attaches of the Bloc countries. Military relations would be non-existent during a genuine split on the model of the Tito-Stalin relationship during 1948-1953. However, embassy military attaches of the Bloc were met by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Chinese PLA, along with officials of the Foreign Ministry’s division dealing with Soviet affairs, army logistics officers, and regional garrison commanders. Analysts and historians need to revisit the nature of these contacts and inquire about some inconsistencies of having a split and maintaining cordial military relations. Why were these Soviet Bloc attaches met with such high level delegations? Why were logistics officials involved? Were there under the table military guarantees, coordination, or specialized exchanges of military assistance? It is crucial to remember that information was provided by defecting General Jan Sejna concerning approaches made by the Czech military attaché to the Chinese for continued military collaboration during the 1960s, as mentioned earlier in this essay. Observers and historians needed to explore what actually occurred at this “army day” receptions behind the scenes.  These are the questions policy makers were either afraid or unwilling to pose to the public at large. By the late 1980s, these military exchanges at embassy receptions blossomed into outright military cooperation between the European and Third World allies of the Soviet Union and China.

In May 1987, the General Political Department of the Chinese PLA received a delegation led by Egon Szabo, the deputy director of the Political Main Directorate of the Hungarian People’s Army for discussions at a state banquet in Beijing.[99] PLA Chief of General Staff General Chi Haotian met with a delegation of the Hungarian People’s Army in October 1988. The Hungarian officers included Lieutenant General Remenyi Gyula, former Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army, and Major General Szabo Egon, Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People's Army.[100] In October 1988, the Chinese Defence Minister Qin Jiwei stated that the exchange between senior Chinese and Hungarian military leaders “signifies a new phase in the relations between the two countries' armed forces.” During the meeting with Hungarian Deputy Minister of Defence Jozsef, Gen Qin Jiwei, also a State Councilor, said “relations between armed forces of China and Hungary have expanded rapidly in recent years. This is not only in the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but also conducive to world peace.” Lt-Gen Pacsek of the Hungarian People’s Army expressed the hope for co-operation in military education, training and industry to his Chinese counterparts.[101]

In 1977, Military Attaché of the GDR Embassy Col. Joachim Schroter hosted a film reception to celebrate the 21st Anniversary of the founding of the East German National People’s Army. China sent Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Defense Chai Cheng-wen and Secretary General of the Office of the General Political Department of the PLA Li Wei to the East German Embassy in Peking to celebrate.[102]  In 1978, GDR Military Attaché in China Wolfgang Uhlstein hosted a reception in Peking to celebrate the 22nd Anniversary of the founding of the East German Army. Deputy Commander of the Peking Garrison Fu Chung-pi was present at this party.[103] Shen Guoliang, Chinese Military Attaché in the GDR, gave a reception in East Berlin to mark the 52nd anniversary of the foundation of the PLA. It was attended by officers of the National People's Army (NVA).[104]  In 1980, the GDR Embassy Military Attaché Colonel Wolfgang Uhlstein met with Pan Yan, Deputy Commander of the PLA Peking Units and Commander of the Peking Garrison to celebrate the 24th Anniversary of the East German NVA.[105] In 1981, Colonel Uhlstein met with General Chi Haotian, Deputy CGS of the Chinese PLA, to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the NVA.[106] The military attaché at the Chinese Embassy in the GDR, Ding Feipeng marked the 55th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. It was attended by Lt-Gen Joachim Goldbach, Deputy Minister of National Defence, and other generals and officers in the NVA, including the Berlin City Commandant, Lt-Gen Karl-Heinz Drews.[107] In 1983, the Military Attaché of the GDR Embassy Col. Egon Muller celebrated the 27th Anniversary of the NVA in the PRC. The Chief of the PLA General Staff Xu Xin was present for the celebration.[108] In 1985, the GDR Embassy hosted a reception honoring the founding of the NVA in the presence of Xu Xin and also other high ranking officers of the Chinese Navy and Air Force.[109] Song Wenzhong, chief of the International Relations Administration of the Chinese Ministry of Defence, visited East Germany in 1987. He was received by Col-Gen Fritz Streletz, Deputy Defence Minister and Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army.[110] The GDR named one of their polytechnic schools after the famed Chinese PLA Marshal Zhu De in June 1987.[111]  In 1988, General Chi Haotian, met Heinrich Winkler, Head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR in Beijing.[112]  In September 1989, Yang Baibing, Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese PLA, met with Horst Brunner, Vice-Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Political Department of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. He accompanied a delegation led by Egon Krenz and the purpose of this mission was to forge relations between the political workers of the two armies.[113]  In late October 1989, Col. Gen. Xu Xin led a delegation to the GDR and met with Minister of Defense Gen. Heinz Kessler.[114] Zhou Keyu, Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, hosted a GDR Army delegation at a banquet in November 1989 in China.[115]

In 1979 Colonel Zdenek Kutall, who was the Military Attaché of the CSSR Embassy in China held a reception celebrating the establishment of the Czech Army. Joining him was Chai Chengwen, Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence.[116] Col. Kutal also held another celebration for the Czech Army in Peking in 1981, with Qiu Weigao, Deputy Commander of the Beijing Garrison of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.[117] In 1984, Lt. Col. Miroslav Kurilla of the Czechoslovak People’s Army celebrated the 40th anniversary of the CSSR army in China. Attending the reception were Zhu Yunqian, Deputy Head of the General Political Department of the Chinese PLA, Yuan Jie, Deputy Commander of the Beijing Military Region, An Liqun, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, and Wen Shou, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force.[118] In 1988, CSSR Military Attaché in the PRC Col. Vladimir Ferenc celebrated the 44th Anniversary of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. This celebration was attended by Major General He Qizong, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese PLA, Lt. Gen. Li Laizhu, Deputy Commander of the PLA Beijing Military Area Command.[119] In November 1989, a Chinese military delegation headed by Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army visited Prague and conferred with Czech Communist General Secretary Gustav Husak, Czechoslovak Defense Minister General Milan Vaclavih, and Army Chief of General Staff Colonel General Miroslav Vacek. Husak stated to Xu Xin that the CSSR supports China’s “safeguarding socialism and maintaining world peace.” Husak added further that the CSSR “cherishes its relations with China and hopes to further overall cooperation with China.”[120] In September 1990, PLA Lt. Gen. Zhu Dunfa led a delegation which visited Czechoslovakia and conferred with Maj. Gen. Wentel of the Czechoslovak People’s Army.[121]

In August 1989, China and Cuba exchanged high level military delegations in Peking. Gen. Chi Haotian, Chief of General Staff of the Chinese PLA, met Maj.-Gen. Moises Sio Wong, Director of the State Reserve Institute of Cuba, which is mainly engaged in maintaining the material needs for the state and army.[122] In 1990, Gen. Chi Haotian, Chief of General Staff of the Chinese PLA, met with Lt-Gen Ulises Rosales, Chief of General Staff of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) in Beijing.  The Xinhua release noted that “Chi and Rosales expressed the hope that friendship and co-operation between China and Cuba and between their armed forces will continue to grow in the days to come.”[123]  

In 1978, a Chinese military delegation led by member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese PLA Yang Yung visited Romania. Yang met with Romanian Army Lieutenant-General Ion Suta, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces.[124]  In 1984, Romanian Defense Minister Constantin Olteanu and General Vasile Milea met with Chinese PLA General Yang Dezhi and extolled “the friendly relations between the two peoples and armies.”[125] In August 1989 Wang Fang, Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security, met a delegation from Romania's Ministry of Internal Affairs led by the head of its Department of Technical, Material and Equipment for Police Force. During the meeting, Wang said Chinese public security departments will maintain and strengthen technical exchanges and co-operation with their foreign counterparts in cracking down on international crimes.[126] In September 1989, Romanian Defense Minister Vasile Milea noted that “the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has proved with its actions to be an army loyal to socialism and the Chinese Communist Party.” Minister Milea met with General Guo Linxiang, Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the PLA and they noted “the two sides highly appraised the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two armies, two parties and two peoples. They pledged continued efforts for further development of these relations.”[127] In July 1990, Romania celebrated the 63rd Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese PLA. Present at the celebration were Lieutenant General C. Ionits, Commander of the Artillery of Romanian Armed Forces. Lt. General Ionits said the military in Romania will continue efforts to develop friendly relations with the PLA. The general stated the Romanian state and army leaders hold cooperative relations with China and the PLA to be a step towards maintaining peace in Europe and the world.[128] In November 1991, Chinese Vice-President Wang Zhen met with Lieutenant General Dumitru Cioflina, Secretary of State of the Defense Ministry and Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of Romania. Wang noted to the Romanian delegation that “China firmly abides by Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and the socialist road, as well as the reform and open policy. The PLA is under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and is entrusted with the important tasks of defending the country from enemy invasion and safeguarding socialist system.”[129]

                In 1978 the Chinese intelligence agencies revamped their regional base in Belgrade under Wang Chenxi. In the early 1980s, Qiao Shi and Tao Siju travelled to Belgrade to enhance ties with Yugoslav intelligence (UDBA). When they arrived in Belgrade, Stane Dolanc, security chief for President Josip Broz Tito was asked to forge permanent ties with the Chinese. Those links have remained strong ever since, thanks partly to the efforts of Col. Slavko Milojevic, a one-time Yugoslav military attaché in Beijing. These ties continued throughout the rule of the communist (LCY) and Milosevic (SPS-Socialist Party of Serbia) dictatorships.[130] In 1978, an artillery division of the Peking units of the Chinese PLA held a meeting today in celebration of the 37th anniversary of the founding of the Yugoslav People's Army. Yugoslav Military Attaché Col. Slavko Milojevic and Wang Yang, Deputy Commander of the PLA Peking units, was present. Artillery division commander Lu Lien-Chang spoke about President Tito's strategic policy of “total national defence” and how the Yugoslav People's Army had actively carried out military training and strengthened “total national defence” and “social self-protection.” Lu also said: “the commanders and fighters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army will, as always, contribute to strengthening the friendship between the peoples and armies of the two countries.”Colonel Milojevic then discussed the growth and development of the Yugoslav People's Army and its contributions in defending the liberty and independence of Yugoslavia during the national liberation period and the socialist construction. Col. Milojevic also said: “taking into consideration our non-aligned foreign policy and physiognomy of modern warfare, our art of war is based on the principles of total national defence. The members of our army participate directly in the building of our country and in political and social life, their specific task being to prepare the working people and citizens to defend the country. The friendly and co-operative relations between the armies of Yugoslavia and China has developed on the basis of the general development of the relations between our two socialist countries.[131] In 1983, Qin Jiwei, Alternate Member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and Commander of the Beijing units of the Chinese PLA met with Admiral Branko Mamula, member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Federal Secretary for Defense. [132] In 1984, Chief of the General Staff of the PLA General Yang Dezhi visited the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and met with Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) General Patar Gracanin.[133] In 1985, A celebration in the Belgrade Club of the Yugoslav People's Army on 29th July, to mark the 58th anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was attended by Lt-Col-Gen Metodija Stefanovski, Assistant Federal Secretary for People's Defence, and a large number of high-ranking officers.[134] In 1987, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence of Yugoslavia had a reception to mark the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese PLA. Yugoslav People's Army Col., Dusan Pejanovic, “spoke highly of the traditional friendship and cooperation between the armies of the two countries. he also praised the achievements china has made in its economic reform, which he said are important contributions to world peace and international cooperation.”[135] In 1988, Col-Gen Yang Baibing, Head of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army had talks on 16th October with a delegation led by Lt-Col-Gen Simeon Buncic, Deputy Defence Secretary of the Yugoslav People’s Army.[136]

In May 1988 North Korean General O Chin-u met with “Chinese comrades” noting that this relationship between the two communist countries is characterized by: “a special emotion that can be felt only between class brothers and comrades in arms.”[137]  In August 1989, Senior General Choe Gwang of the Korean People’s Army visited Beijing and met with PLA General Chi Haotian. The meeting was hailed positively as a step where “the two parties, armed forces and peoples of China and DPRK support and trust each other in building and defending their countries. We highly cherish this friendship and will make further efforts to make it pass on from generation to generation.”[138] In April 1990, the Chinese Navy Admiral Li Yaowen paid a visit to North Korea. They were received by DPRK dictator Kim Il Sung, who praised the Chinese PLA for quelling “the anti-revolutionary riot last year and achieved national stability, unity and a success in economic construction.”[139]

In 1983, Polish Embassy Military Attaché Colonel Stanislaw Golach hosted a reception to mark the anniversary of the polish people’s army. He Zhengwen, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was present at this reception.[140] In October 1989, Qin Jiwei, State Councilor and Minister of National Defence met a delegation from the General Political Department of the Polish People's Army led by its deputy chief, Zdzislaw Rozbicki, in Peking. They discussed what was termed “the current situation in China.”[141] In 1990, the PLA Military Attaché of the Chinese Embassy to Poland Col Li Aimin  hosted a reception to mark the 63rd anniversary of creating the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Generals and officers of the Polish Army were among the guests present at this reception.[142]

In 1981, Bulgarian Embassy Military Attaché Colonel Kiril Boiadgiev hosted a reception in Peking to celebrate the 37th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian People’s Army.  Ciu Weigao, Deputy Commander of the Beijing Garrison Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was present at this reception.[143] In 1980, Col. Boiadgiev hosted a similar function in Peking with leading members of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense and the Department of Soviet Union and Eastern European Affairs of the Foreign Ministry.[144]  Chinese PLA General Guo Linxiang met with Bulgarian People’s Army Col. Gen. Mitko Mitkov, head of the political department of the Bulgarian People's Army.[145] Guo was met at the airport by R. Minchev, First Deputy Chief of the Headquarters of General Staff, and I. Stefanov, First Deputy Director of the General Political Department among other high-ranking officers of the Bulgarian People's Army.  Guo stated that “he believed the friendship between the armies of the two countries will be further strengthened through his visit here.”[146] Xinhua also noted that “the two generals shared the view that the restoration of military exchanges between the two countries will be beneficial to the modernization and regularization of the armies of both countries.”[147] In October 1991, Bulgarian Defense Minister Senior General Iordan Mutafchiev met PLA General Chi Haotian in Beijing for friendly conversations.[148]

In 1977, Soviet Military Attaché Col. V.I. Soloviev hosted a celebration commemorating the founding of the Soviet Army. China sent the following officers to the Soviet Embassy in the PRC: Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Wu Hsiu-chuan, Deputy Commander of the Peking Garrison Li Chung-chi, and Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Defense Chang Ping-yu.[149]  In 1978, Soviet Military Attaché Col. V.I. Soloviev hosted a celebration commemorating the founding of the Soviet Army. China sent to the Soviet Embassy in Peking PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff Hsiu Chuan, Deputy Director of the PLA Logistics Department Sun Hung-chen, Vice President of the PLA Military Academy Tao Han-chang, and other high ranking PLA and Foreign Ministry officials.[150] In 1982, Soviet Military Attaché Col. N.S. Proskurnin gave a reception to celebrate the 64th Anniversary of the Soviet Army. China sent Zhang Bingyu, Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Defense, to the Soviet Embassy in the PRC to celebrate this event.[151] In 1983, Soviet Ambassador I.S. Shcherbakov and Military Attaché Captain V.P. Kasatkin held a reception to commemorate the 65th Anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Army. Among those present were Zhang Tong, Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Defense and Ma Xusheng, Director of the Department of the Soviet Union and East European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[152] In 1985, Soviet Military Attaché Captain V.P. Kasatkin held a reception to celebrate the 67th Anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Army. Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese PLA was present at this reception.[153] In 1987, Soviet Ambassador to the PRC O.A. Troyanovsky held a reception in China to commemorate the 69th Anniversary of the Soviet Army.  Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese PLA was present at this reception.[154] Chinese and Soviet officers also celebrated the USSR’s participation in the war against the Japanese during World War II.[155] In 1987, the Soviets held discussions with the Chinese about their mutual goal for a nuclear free world.[156] Such a nuclear free world would benefit the communist world, since treaties and professions of peace are tools utilized to psychologically disarm the West. Nuclear disarmament would then also leave the combined Sino-Soviet alliance with a huge conventional force advantage over that of the West.

Expansion of USSR-China Trade 1979-1986

After the death of Mao Tse-tung, trade between the communist powers of China and the Soviet Union greatly increased. Specialized forms of assistance and trade grew into comparatively mammoth trade deals by the mid 1980s. Much dual military-civilian goods were traded between the PRC and the USSR. Such items also included sensitive, critical items such as nuclear technology and re-equipped factories. Supposedly bitter totalitarian enemies or rivals experiencing ideological hostility would never exchange nuclear or heavy amounts of industrial technology. In 1979, China and the USSR signed a trade agreement worth $484 million in exchanges of goods, including Soviet made passenger aircraft and parts.[157] In 1980, Soviet Foreign Trade Vice Minister Ivan Grishin and Chinese Vice Foreign Trade Minister Zheng Tuobin signed a trade agreement in Peking worth around $500 million. Soviet exports to the PRC would include cars and trucks, while China would send the USSR textiles, consumer goods, ores, and metal.[158] Polish Communist dictator Wojciech Jaruzelski met with Deng Xiaoping in September 1986 for a “working visit” widely believed to be linked to trade and cultural relations.[159] Trade between Poland and China was expected to reach $938 million dollars, up from $294 million reported back in 1984.[160] In 1986, East German Communist leader Erich Honecker met with Deng Xiaoping to discuss an increase in party to party relations. The Chinese referred to the East German communists as “comrades.”[161] Increases in trade with the Soviet Union were also reported in the early 1980s. Vladimir N. Sushkov, a Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, stated that the two countries signed an agreement that would increase two-way trade in 1983 to about one billion dollars, a threefold increase over 1982.  Sushkov said: “This trade will be balanced. The growth will be in machinery, spare parts, and equipment. The majority of trade is still in raw materials.” Veteran China reporter Tillman Durdin reported that “At that time the two sides agreed to a five-year pact covering trade, technology transfers and the setting up of a permanent commission on economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation. Over the last year, the development of relations has been impressive. Trade valued at $1.9 billion was up 70 percent over 1984 and about evenly divided between imports and exports. Trade is expected to grow impressively, the Soviets supplying timber, machinery, aviation equipment and high-tech products and China sending light manufactured goods, textiles and agricultural products. Before the split Russia was China's biggest trading partner. Trade deals with the Soviets have been accompanied by agreements with East European communist regimes whereby China will receive trucks, buses, railway refrigeration cars, combine harvesters and other items and get markets for a wide range of Chinese products.”[162] In 1985, China's Deputy Premier Yao Yilin and Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Arkhipov signed a barter trade accord totaling $14 billion worth of goods. The Soviet Union was to supply China with machinery, machine-tool equipment, chemicals, cars and trucks, building materials and unspecified raw materials. The Chinese deliveries to the Soviet Union consisted of consumer goods, agricultural commodities, and some raw materials. The agreement stipulated that the Soviet Union would build seven new plants in China and help modernize 17 industrial installations in the areas of power generation, metal processing, machine building, coal, chemicals and transport. In 1982, the bilateral trade totaled $330 million. It rose to $800 million in 1983 and to $1.2 billion in 1984. [163] In 1985, the Soviets and Chinese signed a contract for the purchase of 17 Tu-154M jet airliners.[164] In that same year, China also acquired Mi-8 helicopters ostensibly for “disaster relief.”[165] The Soviets proposed in 1986 to export nuclear power plants to China.[166] This was mentioned by Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng and Yao Yilin during a meeting of the Joint Sino Soviet Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation.[167]

Re-Linkage With Pro-Soviet Communist Parties and Front Groups

China started to expand or restore its relations with many of the Soviet controlled Communist Parties in the 1980s. The scissors in the Soviet strategy of deception started to slowly materialize into a clenched fist. Relations between the Soviet Union, its satrapies, and China started to coalesce into the alliance of the 1950s. In 1985, a CCP delegation led by Qian Liren of the International Liaison Department met with officials of the Portuguese Communist Party.[168] Zhu Liang of the International Liaison Department met with Alvaro Cunhal of the Portuguese Communist Party in 1986.[169] Gordon McLennan of the Communist Party of Great Britain met with General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Zhu Liang of the International Liaison Department of the CCP in 1986.[170] CCP Politburo member Xi Zhongxun and Zhu Liang met with Joe Slovo of the South African Communist Party in 1986 and praised that organization’s struggle “of the oppressed black people and people from various circles in South Africa.”[171] CPUSA Chairman Gus Hall visited the PRC and restored party to party ties with the Chinese Communist Party. He met with Hu Qili, a theoretician of the Chinese Communist Party and member of the Politburo.[172] Hu Qili of the Chinese Politburo met with a delegation of the Palestine Communist Party led by Naim Abbas al-Ashhab. Both parties established political ties.[173] The Canadian and Chinese Communist Parties restored ties in 1987. Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Hu Qili met with Canadian CP head William Kashtan and they promptly restored party to party relations.[174] In 1987, Israeli Communist Party leader Meir Vilner met with CCP Politburo members Deng Xiao Ping and Hu Qili. Party to Party ties were restored between the Israeli and Chinese Communist Parties.[175] In 1990, George Hawi of the Lebanese Communist Party visited China and met with CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Zhu Liang of the International Liaison Department.[176] Throughout 1991 delegations of the pro-Soviet Indian Communist Party visited China.[177]

 China also sought to co-opt the world progressive and peace movements that were pro-Soviet and/or anti-US. Such progressive and peace movements deliberately or unconsciously blamed the West for the world’s tensions and arms race. They also had a consistently strong tendency to call for the demilitarization of the West and expansion of the socialist economic base in the capitalist world. In 1983 China declared its support for “national liberation movements in southern Africa and the people of Central America, and condemned the United States for invading Grenada. The CCP has also helped promote Arab unity and given form support to the Palestinian people.”[178] In 1982, New China News Agency correspondent Chen Weibin noted that “The peace movement is growing vigorously in the West partly because the economic situation in the United States and Western Europe has deteriorated since the end of last year. These countries are suffering from growing financial deficits, worsening inflation, and rising unemployment, but the governments of these Western countries keep increasing military spending. This has led the people in these countries to demand budget cuts for military expenditures, a cessation of the nuclear arms race, more social welfare, and an increase in job opportunities.”[179] Deng Liqun of the CCP Central Committee noted that “the CCP fully understands, respects, and supports the anti-nuclear movement in West Europe, Japan, and the United States.”[180] Li Yimang, President of the Chinese Association for International Understanding, met with Lewis Hoskins of the executive board of the American Friends Service Committee in 1984.[181] Li also met with Goran von Bonsdorff of the Peace Union of Finland.[182] He Xiquan, Secretary General of the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU) met with a group of US peace activists in New York.[183] A Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) delegation led by Joan Ruddock visited Beijing and met with Li that same year.[184] Li Yimang noted at a conference in China that “The Chinese Association for International Understanding and other people’s organizations in this country wish to strengthen ties and cooperation with the peace movements, peace groupings, and peace activists in various countries…Peace movements and peace groupings in various countries should strengthen their connections on the principles of mutual respect, learning from each other, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and not imposing views on each other, establish all sorts of contacts, and exchange views and experience so as to promote mutual understanding and friendship and realize the broadest cooperation.”[185]

China also sent delegations to attend meetings of the Japanese Communist Party anti-nuclear weapons front group GENSUIYKO. The PRC also held international peace forums in Beijing. Li Yimang noted at a peace forum in Beijing that “The small limited number of nuclear weapons China has to keep at present is solely aimed at resisting nuclear blackmail and intimidation by the superpowers and at helping the struggle for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.”[186] In 1985, the CCP formed the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament.[187] CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang noted that: “Peace movements the world over are waving a tenacious struggle towards the end. Our 1 billion Chinese people are prepared to join hands with peace movements the world over in unremitting efforts for world peace.”[188] PRC State Councilor Ji Pengfei stated to West German (FRG) peace movement leader Rudiger Weigelin that China “supports the peace movement in Europe.”[189] In a meeting with Dutch Communist leader Elli Izeboud, Hu Yaobang “paid tribute to the powerful peace movement emerging in Europe and other parts of the world. He also expressed his appreciation of the Dutch Communist Party’s positive attitude of standing in the forefront of this mass movement.”[190] An International Liaison Department official noted in 1984 that “the CCP has various forms of friendly ties with more than 150 parties and organizations in foreign countries, including communist, socialist, social democratic, and labor parties, and different kinds of political parties in Third World countries. At present our party’s international liaison work is being carried out in more fields and in more ways than ever before. These contacts have helped safeguard world peace, enhance friendship between peoples of various countries and develop mankind’s progressive cause.”[191] In 1985, the Chinese Association for International Understanding held a children’s art exhibition for peace, where high level officials from the National People’s Congress and People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament were present. Representatives from 60 organizations in 20 countries were also present.[192] The Soviets and some of their allies in Europe and the Third World were known to have used children as pawns in the propaganda war to disarm and ideologically cripple the West. Utilizing a child and harnessing their innocence and idealism in the cause of unilateral disarmament of the West was a very powerful tool in the bag of communist tricks. Below the veneer of straightforward humanism is a hidden tactic so sinister and insidious, whose origins lay on the doorstep of the communist party Politburos in Moscow and Beijing and their allies. In 1986, far leftist Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa visited China as a guest of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament, the Three Self Patriotic Movement Committee of Protestant Churches in China, and the Christian Council of China. Tutu stated that he would discuss the “South African situation and other related issues with his Chinese brothers.”[193] In 1986, a delegation of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament headed by Dr. Wu Weiran visited the United States and attended the annual meeting of the Physicians for Social Responsibility.[194] In the same year, Professor Zhou Peiyuan visited the meeting of the Congress of Intellectuals for World Peace in Warsaw Poland.[195]   In 1987, the President of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament Zhou Peiyuan met with the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information Eugene Carroll in Beijing.[196] In that year, Vice President of the Chinese Association for International Understanding Zhu Xuefan met with a Fabian Society delegation from the UK. The Fabian delegation was Lord McIntosh.[197] In 1987, Vice President of the Chinese Association for International Understanding Lei Jieqiong met with a visiting delegation of the Democratic Farmer Labor Party of Minnesota.[198]

The Chinese also sought to launch influence operations into the American conservative and Republican movements in a similar fashion to that of the Soviets, especially under Gorbachev. Communist countries typically utilized linkups with parties and personalities associated with supposedly conservative, big business oriented interests as a means of opening doors to acquiring needed technology. Anti-communist advocates for liberalized trade and technology decontrols allow the communist states to have an easier time convincing the Western public that they are not enemies of freedom. Examples included of this phenomenon included the activities of West German CSU-CDU leader Franz Josef-Strauss in assisting the GDR and the USSR; some conservatives such as Rev. Pat Robertson and Senator Jim DeMint advocating for MFN for China in the late 1990s and early 2000s; and Republicans such as Lawrence Eagleburger, George Shultz, and other individuals tied to big business who were always historically pro-détente and soft on trade controls for the communist world.  Lei Jieqiong of the Chinese National People’s Congress and Association for International Understanding received a delegation of Republicans led by George Strake of Texas.[199] In 1987, Huang Hua of the National People’s Congress met with the Burton Yale Pines, Vice President of the Heritage Foundation and Martin Lasater, who was the Director of the Asian Studies of the Foundation.[200] The Chinese also carried out similar measures as their Soviet counterparts in meeting with corporate globalists to launch similar influence operations. In 1982, Wang Shoudao of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference met with high ranking officials of the Club of Rome. The Club’s delegation was headed by the founder and president Aurelio Peccei.[201]

Despite these meetings where honeyed words of peace and friendship were proclaimed to Western audiences, China continued the decades old nuclear bomb and ICBM program. Chinese PLA and Party military theorists even to this day proclaimed that nuclear weapons are to be utilized in battle with their enemies. The Chinese echoed their supposed Soviet rivals in adhering to the doctrine of the utilization of nuclear bombs and missiles as a battlefield weapons on the road to victory. The PLA newspaper noted back in 1987 that “China’s nuclear strategy can be summed up as a strategy of limited self defensive counterattack, which is not aimed at launching and winning any nuclear wars but at opposing and checking them…In terms of strategy, nuclear weapons have four functions: 1) When manpower, firepower, and the military equipment of conventional troops are short, or when they are reduced to inferiority, deployment or use of tactical or war zone nuclear weapons can make up for and readjust conventional forces. 2) In terms of the positive defensive strategy, medium and short range missiles with nuclear warheads and tactical nuclear weapons that have actual combat capacity can serve as an actual threat to the enemy’s heavy massing of forces and preparations for large scale offensives. 3) In strategic confrontation, nuclear weapons can work as a backup force at a critical moment and force an enemy to consider politically the problem of its self defense, thus deterring the enemy’s blackmail and intimidation to a certain extent…China can triumph over a powerful enemy with its limited force. Once it launches a nuclear counter-attack, it undoubtedly will inflict an unbearable strike on the enemy.”[202] Note the Orwellian double talk of not winning nuclear wars, but checking them. Checking them would simpy mean the elimination of the enemy’s nuclear assets, hence attaining victory. It appears that the Chinese theorists are once again engaged in an artful game of semantics to throw dust in the eyes of Western pacifists and capitalist trading partners.

China Against the West, 1979-1991

China continued its foreign policy directed against the Western capitalist world during the 1980s. Despite trade and assistance from the United States, Japan, and other Western countries, China continued to join their supposed Soviet rivals in backing efforts to spread communist and other leftist Third World revolutions on a worldwide basis. Internal security expert Judge Robert Morris noted that “…the two communist powers are resolving their differences. Both now support the MPLA regimes in Angola, SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU in Zimbabwe, the Shining Path in Peru, Castro in his adventures, the PLO, the ANC in South Africa, and the Puerto Rican terrorists.” Former US Ambassador to the UN and Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick noted that China voted against the United States 86%, thus placing Beijing “in the same column as the Soviet Union.”[203] In another study, China was found to have voted against the United States’ position over 70% of the time. The PRC condemned the Camp David Accords, called for sanctions against South Africa, and supported a Cuban initiated UN resolution calling for the greater economic rights and less human and political freedoms. In 1981, China also increased trade with Poland by thirty percent during the imposition of openly martial law by Jaruzelski.[204] China also shifted to supporting the communist MPLA in Angola during most of the 1980s. In 1979, the MPLA indicated interest in forging ties with the Chinese Communist Party.[205] The All China Federation of Trade Unions issued this statement in 1982: “The All-China Federation of Trade Unions has expressed firm support for the Angolan workers' just struggle. In a message to the National Union of Angolan Workers on 16th August the federation said that the Chinese workers and trade unions strongly condemn the South African troops large-scale invasion of Angola, firmly support the Angolan workers and people in their just struggle to resist aggression and defend national territory, and resolutely support the Namibian workers and people in their just struggle for national liberation.”[206] In October 1988, the CCP and the MPLA signed cooperation accords covering the fields of economy, technology, and trade.[207] In January 1988, Jiang Guanghua of the CCP International Liaison Department visited Angola and conferred with Foreign Minister Alfonso Dunem Nbinda and the Secretary General of the Angolan National Union of Workers.[208] The Chinese continued to maintain relations with various Palestinian terrorist groups, even into the Deng era. In 1980, a delegation of PLO Fatah officials visited the PRC and met with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua. Minister Huang and Abu Jihad of the PLO Fatah proclaimed their continued friendship and denounced Israel.[209] Yasir Arafat visited China in 1984 and toured tank units of the PLA. He met with Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang, who promised “China would provide the cause of Palestinian liberation with political, material and moral assistance within its capability. . . “[210] In 1989, the PLO Political Department Head Faruq Qaddumi met with PRC Prime Minister Li Peng, who pledged China’s continued anti-Israel policy: “The Chinese people have always supported the Palestinian people's struggle against Israeli aggression and expansion. We did so in the past and we will continue to do so in the future. Our principled position will remain unchanged unless Israel gives up its policy of aggression and expansion.”[211] In 1991, Qaddumi made another visit to China and met with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Minister Qichen hailed the Palestinians’ “just cause.”[212] China translated supportive words into concrete action by supplying the PLO with weapons (artillery and ammunition) and military training. The United States was denounced by the PRC for their support for the State of Israel.[213] China also supported the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) fighting to create a communist Namibia. A SWAPO delegation led by Sam Nujoma met with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, who stated in 1983 that: “We have not only supported you politically and morally, but also provided as much material assistance as we can. No matter what changes in the world situation, China will remain firm in supporting your just cause.”[214] In 1985, the Chinese supplied the Nicaraguan Sandinista communist dictatorship with $20 million worth of consumer goods, food, tools, and other forms of aid. China’s premier Zhao Ziyang stated that “China opposes any country that practices the chauvinism of great powers or seeks hegemony over others…(it was) China's “internationalist duty to safeguard the interests” of other Third World countries. China's official English-language newspaper, the China Daily, reported Zhao's remarks under the headline, “Hands Off Nicaragua, Says China's Premier.”[215]

In December 1984, China sent resident military attachés to Cuba. In 1988, China and Cuba ended the requirement for citizens traveling between the two countries to obtain passport vias. The two countries signed a trade agreement in 1988 under which China would buy nearly 100,000 tons of Cuban sugar largely on barter for Chinese products. In 1990, annual Cuba-China trade reached $600 million, and China became second only to the Soviet Union in trade with the island. Among the goods shipped to Cuba included Chinese bicycles that were delivered in the early 1990s. Cuba also backed the PRC government in their crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, when the Cuban foreign minister commended Chinese authorities for “defeating the counterrevolutionary acts.”[216] The Chinese and North Koreans were also reported to have attempted to ship firearms in 1987 to the communist New People’s Army fighting against the governments of Marcos and Aquino.[217] The Chinese also hailed the closer North Korean-Soviet ties occurring in the 1980s. A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman stated the Chinese “positively appraise” the North Korean’s “independent foreign policy and are pleased to see the development of its relations with the Soviet Union.”[218] In 1982, the Soviets expressed support for the One China concept as proposed by the PRC. The radio broadcast expressing this support noted that “the imperialists tried to create a situation of two Chinas.”[219] The Chinese Communists denounced President Reagan’s proposal for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985. Deng Xiaoping stated that SDI would “The 'Star Wars' plan must not be carried out because it would cause qualitative change in the arms race between the superpowers.”[220] In all actuality, strategic missile defense was the only safety measure to ensure the Soviet Union did not win a nuclear conflict with the United States. China was only helping the Soviet Union by opposing former President Reagan’s proposal for SDI. In late 1986, the Soviets stopped the jamming of Chinese radio broadcasts. Six years earlier, the Chinese ceased jamming Soviet radio broadcasts to the PRC.[221] Once again, the mask of a split was slowly falling off, revealing the Bear and the Dragon uniting in shared ideological hostility to Western interests.

China’s weapons export policies continued to go to their allies in the Third World and communist states during the 1970s and 1980s. A number of the countries and “national liberation movements” that the PRC shipped weapons to were also recipients of Soviet and Warsaw Pact manufactured armaments. China shipped weapons to the pro-Soviet Arab socialists of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) through their ally communist Albania. Other pro-Soviet terrorist movements that China shipped weapons to were: FRONTLINAT in Chad, UPC in the Congo, FRELIMO in Portuguese Mocambique (now Mozambique) and ZANU in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The Chinese also supplied weapons to the Soviet satellite dictatorship of South Yemen, along with Baathist Socialist Syria. Arms were also transferred from the PRC via South Yemen to the PLO and the Omani communist terrorist movement, PFLOAG. Baathist Socialist Iraq and Islamic revolutionary Iran also received weapons from the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and China. Both were anti-US dictatorships whose fundamental positions were diametrically opposed to the goals and desires of the Free World. Many of these oil rich Middle Eastern client-allies were also rich sources of hard currency for Beijing’s coffers.[222]

Re-Alignment of the Communist Monolith: Sino-Soviet Rapprochement of 1987-1989

When Gorbachev became dictator of the Soviet Communist Party, he launched a very ambitious deception campaign to erode the image of the USSR as an enemy and implemented a NEP type economic restructuring called perestroika. He continued to modernize the Soviet military, supported revolutions in the Third World, and formulated war plans against NATO in collaboration with his European allies. Gorbachev saw China as a key asset in building a new geopolitical order based on the cooperation of the USSR and the PRC. He saw this partnership of the two communist powers as the catalyst in effecting positive change for the development of global socialism. A U.S. official observed that Gorbachev was out to “capture the imagination of the Chinese people. From our viewpoint, any improvement in Chinese-Soviet relations in a significant way would not be desirable.”[223] Gorbachev and Ceausescu conferred after a Warsaw Pact speech in 1987 about the state of relations between the USSR and China and supported an open rapprochement between the Bloc countries and China:

Nicolae Ceausescu: In regard to the relationships between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and China, we salute this process of normalization, of improvement of relationships, and we deem it very important. We also salute the improvement of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, and hope that a high-level meeting between them will take place in the long run. In fact, the Chinese comrades have declared that they are ready to go to Moscow. In my view, this is not difficult to arrange, and the possibility exists of some positive results being reached. Comrade Deng Xiaoping told me that although it was difficult for him to travel to Moscow, he was willing to do so.
Comrade M. S. Gorbachev:
We must help [Deng Xiaoping], we can help him.
Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:
I am convinced that this can be done.”[224]

The Deng-Gorbachev summit that took place in Beijing in 1989 brought Soviet-Chinese relations to a new level. Technology transfer, joint economic ventures, international relations (i.e. war against capitalism), and the establishment and further improvement of world socialism were various points of cooperation agreed upon at the Deng Gorbachev summit. It appeared that Sino-Soviet relations were openly moving back to the level of the period 1949-1960. The Joint Communiqué issued by the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties in 1989 stipulated, among other items, that “The Soviet Union and China will develop relations in economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields actively, in a planned manner on the basis of principles of equality and mutual benefit, and will help improve mutual understanding and contacts between the people of the two countries. The sides consider it useful for the two countries to exchange information and experience in the field of building socialism, restructuring and reform, as well as opinions on issues of mutual interest that concern bilateral relations and the international situation. Disagreements on these or other matters should not hamper the development of relations between the two states.”[225]

Economic relations were also solidified in the Deng-Gorbachev summit of 1989: “In practically all the conversations that were held the question arose of the expediency of utilising the great potential residing in Soviet-Chinese economic links. We shared a common view with Comrade Li Peng that co-operation needs to be put on a long-term footing and be given a long-term character and that up-to-date forms of this co-operation need to be more widely introduced such as direct links, joint production, the creation of joint enterprises and design offices and so forth. Power engineering, metallurgy, transport and consumer goods production were referred to as promising areas. Comrades Maslyukov and Tian Jiyun who are co-chairman of the Soviet-Chinese commission for economic, trade, scientific and technical co-operation continued the exchange today that was started yesterday. And as Comrade Maslyukov told me, that exchange was very intensive and productive and led to a serious understanding and uncovering of new possibilities in all directions of bilateral co-operation.”[226] Hence, the Soviet-Chinese economies would be linked together on a tighter basis, with economically and militarily significant industries such as power engineering, metallurgy, and transportation. The end result would be a shift in the balance of power to the West. Technical and scientific cooperation could also entail the sharing of pilfered Western technology courtesy of the KGB, GRU, China’s Ministry for State Security, and the Military Intelligence of the PLA.

One Soviet correspondent for the Greek newspaper Rizospastis queried Gorbachev as to the specifics of the cooperation between the CPSU and CCP. Gorbachev answered: I would not now like to express a completely fixed opinion on this matter yet. But I would like to inform you that we have an accord, which is moreover based on mutual understanding, o n the fact that we are very interested in the development of co-operation between our parties. This is above all dictated by the fact that both the Chinese people and the Soviet people are resolving historical and revolutionary tasks on the roads of reform and restructuring and they have before them many very complex and new tasks and tasks which are similar in many ways. Naturally, we have an interest in restructuring achieving its aims and in the reforms which are under way in China also achieving their aims with fewer losses, with fewer shortcomings, with less painfulness and with fewer difficulties. And exchange will to a certain extent also enable us to achieve this, in so far as we really are to a large extent resolving similar tasks. We have come to feel that in the first instance what should be brought to the fore is co-operation in interpreting what we have achieved and in forecasting, scientifically forecasting, the aims and the new qualities of socialism which we are striving for. There is a large field of activity for our social scientists here. We brought this to light and reached agreement on this yesterday that this should be a primary task. Finally, we recognised it as essential that inter-party contacts should embrace not only the top level but also the regions, the party organisations in the areas where the reform process is under way in both the USSR and China. I think that including the experience of party organisations and work collectives in inter-party exchanges will allow both parties to enrich their experience, to compare, to see pluses and minuses, to bring to light positive aspects. In general, you know, in my opinion, a large field for co-operation is being opened up in that area. [Man] Mikhail Sergeyevich, I would like to continue this theme of inter-party relations of a new type, between the CPSU and the CCP compared with other communist parties? [Gorbachev] I think that what became clear at our meeting yesterday with the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee allows me to say that there will be broad co-operation which will embrace all problems which we discuss today with other communist parties. And, you know, I think that another thing in common will be something which has today already become firmly established in relations between communists and communist parties; this will be co-operation between equals, on principles of respectful attitude to the point of view of each, the experience of each, non-interference in internal affairs; and this will be what we learned from bitter experience and have understood well and have mastered and are now transferring, into the practice of relations between communist parties. [Soviet television here added a question from a correspondent asking ''In conditions of the normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations, from the point of view of the general world situation, what influence can this factor exert on the development of the world situation?'' Gorbachev replied ''I think a positive one, only a positive one.''] [Man] A question from Radio GDR, Comrade General Secretary. This morning you discussed co-operation between scientists of the USSR and the PRC. Can you picture a flight by a Chinese cosmonaut on the 'Mir' station? [Gorbachev] Well, you know, we did not discuss this question in a specific sense, but I see no obstacles. If you ask me, I would welcome this. But at the moment, there has been no such question or request. [Gorbachev] For all that, I shall reply to the second part of the question, since I consider that I gave an exhaustive answer to the first part of the question. This does not by any means signify that everyone is satisfied with it. But the second part about the painfulness of the processes of renewal in the socialist countries, I would say I would reply to that part of your question in the following manner. First, that is the confirmation of the fact that the processes taking place in the socialist countries are of a profound nature. This is not a cosmetic refurbishment, these are changes which profoundly affect all spheres of the life of society in the socialist states. Some people have seen that as a crisis of socialism. But I am convinced that we are present at a serious turning point in the development of world socialism. This process is occurring in all countries with varying intensity taking into account the specific characteristics of the various states, the different rates of change and perhaps with changes of different depths. But this is dictated by a specific situation. But the direction of these processes is, for all that, to uncover the potential that lies in this system on the paths of democratisation, glasnost, on the paths of bringing man out as the main character. But, you see, socialism is the system of the working people. Therefore the main character in all these changes is man. And the fact that the economy is turning in the direction of man and the political process is progressing in the context of the further development of democratisation, the inclusion of the actual processes of drawing up decisions, of approving decisions these are highly promising changes and, if we add to that that very deep-going processes are going ahead in the sphere of spiritual development and in the final count that is the most important thing for we most probably come into this world not just  to consume, but we consume in order to live, in order to realise the potential of the individual. Therefore, from this point of view, I think that, since these are deep-going processes, that they cannot occur easily, simply. They sometimes acquire a painful nature, but these are processes that we need and which, in the end, will bring us out into a new stage of development and will impart to socialism its second wind. In any event, we have embarked upon a path of deep-rooted, revolutionary changes and we shall proceed along this path confidently and firmly. If anyone should think that this path is leading us onto the scrap-heap of history, I believe that once again he will be profoundly disappointed.”[227] Gorbachev’s responses in the paragraph above implicitly reveals much about the intentions and the nature of the cooperation between the USSR and China as laid out in the summit with Deng. Gorbachev’s refusal to outline further specifics on the technical and scientific collaboration indicates that the Soviet General Secretary has something to possibly hide. Perhaps the scientific and technical cooperation would entail joint modernization efforts of their military power? Or exchanges between the special services of the Soviet Union and China of stolen or legally acquired technology? Gorbachev also implied that the normalization of party to party relations between China and the USSR would result in the strengthening of world socialism. The Soviet dictator also provided fair warning that so called reforms and restructuring in China and the USSR were not intended to dismantle communist power. Instead, communist power would be greatly enhanced.

Gorbachev added in a 1989 speech on the nature of China Soviet relations “We are convinced that there is a real possibility and necessity of finding a common denominator for the heterogeneous interests and standpoints which exist here. This requires, above all, that any impulses towards hegemonism and pressure are overcome, and that any interference in internal affairs is ruled out.”[228] The common denominator that Gorbachev refers to was the commitment to world communism with a modernized and efficient basis. The Soviet dictator also noted that “And of course, for us communists, devoted to the ideas of the international solidarity of peoples, participation in this noble affair is a question of conviction and duty… It seems that this idea fits in with the concept of the new international political order, on which we had a substantive conversation with the Chinese leaders… We are all simply obliged to use the available historic chance to the good of the present and future generations I would like to express the hope and confidence that, in this struggle for the future, the USSR and the PRC will actively co-operate, and that our countries will make a worthy contribution to the resolution of the problems of the world community.”[229] Beneath the Marxist-Leninist double talk and sweet sounding rhetoric, Gorbachev clearly indicates the ultimate goal for Chinese Soviet cooperation was an irrevocable shift in the balance of power towards the socialist community. The “new international political order” that Gorbachev clearly mentions in the paragraph above refers to communist world dominance. “International solidarity of peoples” refers to communist and leftist parties and so called liberation movements proliferating on the world stage and eliminating the capitalist, democratic governments of the West.

Soviet commentator Alexander Bovin noted in 1989 that the Soviet-Chinese summit and alliance would have a powerful impact on the world situation: It can hardly be doubted that the normalisation of relations between the two greatest socialist powers will influence the overall tenor of world politics. Both China and the Soviet Union advocate the profound restructuring of international relations, the continuation of detente, disarmament, the elimination and prevention of local conflicts and the opportunity for every people to decide its own fate for itself and make its own historical choice. These are precisely the ‘cards’ which both Moscow and Peking want to play. Since this is so, pressure in favour of strengthening peace, security, equality and justice in the international arena will increase. The normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations will also have a positive impact in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, it is already beginning to take effect.”[230]  Bovin’s commentary reveals much about the desired outcomes of the open, renewed Sino-Soviet collaboration. The “positive impact for Asia” refers to the neutralization of Asia into an entente with both the USSR and China. Hence both blades of the scissors will move together into one clenched fist. Governments in Asia and the Pacific region who utilized the “China Card” as a tool against the Soviet Union would find themselves potentially neutralized. They invested too much of their political and economic clout with China and it was too late to reverse course. Détente, disarmament, and influencing the “overall tenor of world politics” were simply buzzwords in the arsenal of communist lexicon for the weakening and destruction of the Free World in the face of the Sino-Soviet Axis and their neutralized quasi-allies.

The theme of a new world order under communist influence was echoed by another Soviet commentator Vsevolod Ovchinnikov. He stated in 1989: The concept of a new international political order, recently put forward in Peking, is fundamentally consonant with the principles of the new political thinking by which Moscow is guided. The two great socialist powers, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, have a special responsibility for mankind's survival, the restructuring of international relations and the creation of a new world political order.”[231] Restructuring of international relations refers to the shift in what the Soviets would term the “correlation of forces” between the capitalist and socialist world.

Rinman Ribao commented that Gorbachev and Deng discussed the direction socialism and Marxism would take in the world at large. The articles summarized: “This approach will help us will help make use, in practice of various new thoughts to enrich and develop Marxism, and bring new momentum to the undertaking of socialism.” The foreign policy of the Sino-Soviet alliance would oppose “hegemony” and create a “new international political order” on a “step by step” basis.[232]

It appears that there is some anecdotal evidence to explicitly prove that the open Sino-Soviet rapprochement of 1989 was intended to place the United States at a disadvantage. Chhin Sun-an was a diplomat serving the Soviet-Vietnamese puppet dictatorship of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in Prague (CSSR) who defected from that regime. Chhin described the Sino-Russian sponsored negotiations between the Khmer Rouge communists and the PRK: “The national reconciliation policy of the Phnom Penh government did not come from the goodwill of Hanoi and Phnom Penh. It was the result of Soviet pressure. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa once told the Phnom Penh government that it should talk with the Khmer Rouge so that the USSR could reduce Chinese Soviet tension and isolate the USA.”[233] Kapitsa implicitly admitted to his Kampuchean (Cambodian) comrades that the reasoning behind the open Sino-Soviet realignment was the strategically checkmate and hasten the downfall of the United States. Workers World, organ of the Workers World Party in the USA, was even more explicit in their rejoicing on the alignment of Soviet-Chinese relations. The newspaper noted “No matter how much the imperialists are trying to conceal their disappointment, rapprochement among the socialist countries is a direct rebuff to the main element in imperialist foreign policy, which has been to exacerbate and envenom the differences in the socialist camp to the point of open conflict, if possible. A new friendly relationship between the two socialist states will certainly have a profound effect in all of Asia. Hopefully, notwithstanding the bourgeois character of the economic reforms, it will stimulate a new chapter in the anti-imperialist struggle against the U.S., Japan, and the other imperialist countries.[234] Soviet allies in the Third World and Warsaw Pact praised the open rapprochement of the USSR and China. The Vietnamese communist newspaper Nhan Dan noted that this open Sino-Soviet rapprochement “benefits not only the peoples of the USSR and China but also peace and security in the world. It also helps improve the atmosphere in Asia and the Pacific.” Such a development “wins the sympathy from the public at large in various countries.”[235] The PRC became militant in its opposition to Western wishful thinking that reforms occurring in the USSR, China, and the rest of the socialist world had a long range goal of the destruction of communism. China expressed these concerns in 1989 by stating: “The entire imperialist Western world is vainly attempting to make the socialist countries drop the socialist road and eventually bring them under the control of international monopoly capital. We must stand up to this tide and take a clear-cut stand.”[236]

China Against the West, 1989-1991

The PRC continued to provide material and moral support to the enemies of the Free World even during the time of the controlled reforms of perestroika, glasnost, and other Leninist style “openings” to the West and market mechanisms. China supported the efforts of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to stem resistance: “The White House has decided to use the dollar to ''create'' a ''Trojan Horse'' in Nicaragua. The 'Washington Post' disclosed on 9th September that the US government will provide the opposition faction in Nicaragua with 3m dollars as a fund for the election contest, so that it may defeat the Sandinista regime by peaceful means in the February 1990 elections and obtain what the anti-government forces are unable to obtain on the battlefield by means of ''democracy'' and ''freedom''. . . This is but a change from the tactic of armed evolution to ''peaceful evolution'' and an attempt to transport a ''Trojan Horse'' into Nicaragua. This tactic of ''peaceful'' subversion from within is more ''legal'' than the old one and is not as easily seen and disgusting as gunfire on the battlefield. 'Washington Post' said that this method would not be opposed by the US Congress either. Nevertheless, it merits people's attention.”[237] The Chinese newspaper Renmin Ribao also opined in October 1989 that: US President Bush signed a bill on 21st October, offering 9m dollars of ''aid'' to the Nicaraguan opposition party to enter into next February's elections. This move by the USA has incurred condemnation by the Nicaraguan National Assembly. . . A White House spokesman said in a statement that the purpose of the money allocated to the Nicaraguan opposition party was to ensure ''genuine, free and fair elections'' there. We would like to ask: On what does the USA base this flagrant interference in the internal elections of a sovereign state? In the eyes of certain US rulers, mutual respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs are cast to the winds. . .”[238] The same newspaper noted in August 1989 that “As everyone knows, the Nicaraguan anti-government armed forces, which constitute a major obstacle to realizing peace in Central America, have been organized and backed by the USA.”[239] The Chinese government also supported the Noriega-Solis regime in Panama in the late 1980s and firmly opposed the US liberation of that country under the Bush Administration. The PLA newspaper denounced US policies “as a continuation of US interference in the internal affairs of Panama, and aroused the Panamanian people’s stronger resentment and opposition.”[240] In November 1989, Peking Radio lambasted “the gross interference by the USA in the internal affairs of Panama.”[241] Xiao Fangqin noted in December 1989 that “the shooting of one US soldier in Panama was not a reason to send troops to invade a sovereign state.” The pro-communist Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao noted that “President Endara won the general elections in Panama but added that few members of Noriega's military command had changed sides since Noriega's threat had not been eliminated. Hence the legitimacy of his (Endara's) power remains questionable.”[242] A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman hotly opposed the US liberation of Panama by stating that the US “military invasion” of Panama “violates the norms of international law and the aims and purposes of the UN Charter.” The PRC spokesman added “We were shocked and condemn this act.” The USA should “immediately stop” its action “to prevent a deterioration of the situation.”[243]

By 1989, China also tightened their alignment with the outright Soviet satellites in the Third World and Europe. The PRC supported initially the hard line communists such as Ceausescu and Honecker. Once Gorbachev launched his campaign to restructure Eastern Europe with so called “reform” communists in late 1989, Beijing shifted its support to these new rulers. China’s aim was the open preservation of communist, proletarian dictatorship and party hegemony in Eastern Europe. One Western diplomat noted in September 1989 that “China is looking for friends now and it has found one in East Germany.”[244] The GDR supported China’s suppression of the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The puppet GDR People’s Chamber noted that: “…the people’s power saw itself forced to restore order and security by the use of the armed forces.”[245] In October 1989, high-ranking Soviet bloc delegations visited China on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the PRC. They included: “Egon Krenz, member of the Politburo and member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Deputy Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR; Wolfgang Rauchfuss, member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of GDR; Miroslav Zavadil, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions of Czechoslovakia; I V Arkhipov, former First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society; Lionel Soto, member of the Secretariat of the Cuban Communist Pary Central Committee; Stefan Murin, Chairman of the Czechoslovakia-China Friendship Committee; Yi Cha-pang, Chairman of the State Commission of Science and Technology and chairman of the Korea-China Friendship Association from the DPRK; Yun Ki-chong, Minister of Finance of DPRK; (?Binbzhav Batar) Minister of Communications of the People's Republic of Mongolia.”[246] China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the East German Stasi collaborated with each other before the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. Ceausescu’s Securitate also had relations with the Chinese intelligence and security apparatus.[247] The PRC newspaper Liaowang noted in late November 1989 that new East German communist dictator Egon Krenz “is also faced with the challenge and threat from the Western countries. In the FRG (West Germany/Federal Republic of Germany) there has always been a force attempting to destroy the socialist GDR. They continue to refuse recognition of GDR citizenship and support the reactionaries. They hope a multi-party system will appear in the GDR.”[248] The Chinese state owned press and media were ordered in December 1989 to “stress the point that the communist parties in Eastern Europe still do not give up socialism.”[249]  In a meeting with East German SED leader Erich Honecker, Vice Premier and CCP Politburo member Yao Yilin noted that “it (communist East Germany) is viewed with outrage and contempt the actions of certain circles of imperialism to discredit the achievements of socialism in the GDR….the partners in the talks agreed that at present a particularly aggressive anti-socialist attitude of the imperialist class opponent could be observed aiming to reverse the development of socialist development.”[250]  NPC leader Chen Muhua met with Bedrich Svestka of the Czechoslovak Peace Defenders’ Committee in Beijing in November 1989.[251]  A delegation of the CCP United Front Work Department led by Song Kun visited the GDR in November 1989 for a friendly visit.[252] In September 1989, a delegation of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament visited the USSR and met with the Soviet Peace Committee. A member of the delegation noted that: “utterly specific understandings have been achieved on implementing cooperation,” including an exhibition of children’s drawings “for peace.”[253]

Sino Soviet Military and Economic Collaboration 1987-1991

The firm professions of alliance and ideological solidarity were backed by actions carried out by the Soviets, Chinese, and their “reformist” communist allies. In 1989, the Soviets were reported to expand their apartment blocks in Beijing to house their diplomats, which numbered at least 500 personnel. Soviets were known to shop in markets and department stores in Beijing for consumer goods that are scarce back in the USSR. Soviet trade delegations visited Chinese cities, while over 1,000 Chinese laborers were working in farms, logging camps, and construction sites in the USSR. Even Soviet and Chinese border troops started to engage in friendly exchanges.[254] In July 1989, it was reported that the Chinese were establishing factories in the Soviet Union. These factories produced machines and soya bean products for export to China and within the USSR.[255] In December 1989, the Chinese and East Germans concluded a trade agreement. The East Germans were to export to China tramcars, trucks, machine tools, and construction machinery. The Chinese were to export to the GDR garments, chemicals, rice, soya beans, and metallic concentrates.[256] In February 1990, there were 1,000 resident Chinese workers in the GDR.[257] In June 1990, a joint Chinese, Soviet, and Eastern European trade fair was held in Harbin. The participating Eastern European and Communist countries were Bulgaria, CSSR, Hungary, North Korea, Poland, Romania, GDR, and Yugoslavia.[258] On the dawn of the re-unification of Germany, China continued to express interest in East German products. The Chinese Trade Councilor in their Embassy in the GDR specifically wanted continuous supply of GDR made refrigerated trucks, polygraph machines, presses, HGVs, mowers, diesel engines, textile machines, and machine tools.[259]

The military contacts between the USSR and China greatly expanded during the period 1989-1991. The joint celebrations of “army days” morphed into outright military exchanges between the top commanders of the Red Army and the PLA. The Chinese delegation to the Farnborough Air Show (1988) in the UK noted that the PRC was seeking to purchase Soviet made missiles. In March 1989, the Kamov Design Bureau participated in an air show in China. China invited Soviet specialists to visit PRC aircraft engine factory to determine the extent of assistance to be provided by Moscow. In November 1989, PRC Foreign and Defense Ministry officials visited the USSR and discussed “strengthening mutual trust and other issues.”[260]  In April 1990, a delegation led by Chinese PLA General Song Wenzhong visited various Soviet military installations. Song met with Col. Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Moiseyev also met with Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese PLA. In June 1990, Col. Gen. Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission met with Defense Minister General Dmitry Yazov, General Moiseyev, and Air Force General A.N. Yefimov.[261] In July 1990, General Xu Xin of the PLA met with Soviet veterans’ groups.[262] In September and October of 1990, the Chinese and Soviets were negotiating the purchase of Su-24 and Su-27 combat jet planes for the PRC Air Force. In January 1991, the Soviets also signed a technical cooperation agreement for the provisioning of turbojet engine blades, titanium alloys, and advanced composite materials for the PRC armed forces.[263] In May 1991 Soviet Defense Minister General Yazov concluded an agreement with China for a sale of 24 SU-27 jet fighter bombers to Beijing. China was also to acquire the technology and equipment from the USSR to produce these planes within the PRC. [264] China also concluded a barter agreement with the USSR where they would take delivery of Soviet MIG-27 jet fighters in exchange for $733 million worth of PRC food, consumer goods, and textiles.[265] In August 1991, General Chi Haotian of the PLA visited the USSR and met with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov. Xinhua noted “the two men said they believed the contact between Chinese and Soviet people and the two armies would continually strengthen and develop. During his one-week official and friendly visit to the Soviet Union, Chi also held a departing talk with Mikhail Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. While staying in the Soviet Union, the Chinese guests visited Moscow, Volgograd, Sevastopol, Kiev and Leningrad. They also met with leaders in the military districts of North Caucasia, Kiev and Leningrad and the Black Sea Fleet, and visited military facilities and observed strategic manoeuvres there.”[266] In July 1991, General Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA met with Soviet veterans’ groups.[267] In June 1991, PLA Chief of General Staff Gen. Chi Haotian met with Senior General VM Arhipov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of the Main Board of Army in the Rear. Chi noted that the visit “would contribute to the development of the existing friendly relations between the two nations and armies.” Arhipov noted “that the PLA has become strong armed forces, and he was satisfied with the growth of the friendly ties between the two armies. Both sides expressed willingness to further enhance the friendship between the two armies.” Xinhua also noted that General Zhao Nanqi, member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the General Logistics Department of the PLA.[268]

The Soviets refused to show scenes of the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square on their state television network in 1989. Gorbachev reportedly scolded the demonstrators as “hotheads.” Specifically, the Soviet dictator stated to his Chinese allies: “We, too, have hotheads who want to renovate socialism overnight. But it doesn't happen in real life. Only in fairy tales.” Soviet newspaper Pravda dismissively noted: “It appears that in an attempt to exploit the current situation in order to put pressure on the government, the students have lost the support of many people who sympathized with them.”(This was written by their political commentator Vsevolod Ovchinnikov.)[269] Top secret files that were smuggled out by Pavel Stroilov indicated that Gorbachev displayed open support and insensitivity towards the Chinese army’s actions in Tiananmen Square in 1989: “Thus, notes taken at Politburo meeting on 4 October 1989 read:

Lukyanov reports that the real number of casualties in Tiananmen Square was 3,000.

Gorbachev: We must be realists. They, like us, have to defend themselves.

Three thousand . . . So what? [270]

It even appears the Soviet and Chinese authorities collaborated in repatriating defectors seeking freedom in the West from communist tyranny. In August 1990, the Soviets forcibly repatriated a defecting Chinese pilot Senior Lt. Van Baoshi, who flew his MIG-19 jet fighter to Vladivostok and announced that he wanted to go to the United States. Baoshi was picked up by a Chinese civil aviation aircraft and transported back to the PRC, to a fate consisting of certain imprisonment or execution for defection.[271]

The Hong Kong newspaper Cheng Ming noted that Deng Xiaoping supported the creation of a new Sino-Soviet bloc to help restore a new communist international. This article confirms that much of the purpose of the evolution of the open rapprochement between the USSR and China was the protection and expansion of communism. The Soviets were to train Chinese PLA forces and supply them with inexpensive military hardware recently withdrawn from Eastern Europe. The capitalist world was to be milked for technology and assistance to strengthen the communist giants. Lastly, a new Warsaw Pact or socialist alliance was to be constructed in Asia to counter the West. The Cheng Ming article reportedly had Deng stating that: “’It is fortunate to see the USSR's party and people wake up...I think the USSR is redeemable, and I just do not believe that socialism with 70 years of history will collapse because of a few difficulties…This is a bitter lesson for communists in the whole world!...China and the USSR are neighbours. The CCP and the CPSU have traditional friendship and cooperative relations; when they have difficulties, we must give them our hand and help them. Of course, on a problem of basic principle, we must not give up our stand.’ Based on the spirit of these ''important instructions'' by Deng Xiaoping, the CCP Central Committee formulated a new diplomatic strategy and policy. Among the several major principles of this policy are (1) Build new friendly Sino-Soviet relations;(2) Further strengthen friendly relations with North Korea; (3) With friendly Sino-Soviet relations as the core, establish a new socialist ''alliance circle'' comprising the five nations of China, the USSR, North Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam;(4) When facing the West, do not struggle over some trivial problems, but make appropriate concessions so as to win economic aid from the West; in particular, utilize Japan's economic strength. Although the USSR lags far behind the USA in military technology and equipment, it remains far ahead of communist China. Therefore, communist China still wants old (or semi-old) Soviet tanks and old (or semi-old) fighter planes, which can be bought with cash. Not long ago, the Soviet Defence Minister visited China and promised that the USSR will use all its strength to help ''modernize'' China's weapons. He said it will sell to China a large number of the ''advanced'' arms which it withdrew from Eastern Europe, at the lowest price, some even at the price of ''scrap iron'', if China will pay the transport fees. It has been alleged that the CCP Central Committee is very much interested in the deal. Apart from buying weapons from the USSR, communist China also sends military personnel to the USSR for training. A number of pilots, artillery troops, armoured troops and paratroops will also be sent to the USSR's military academies or units for training. Communist China's artillery troops were founded right after the army, the earliest service arm established. At present, the biggest problem is arms modernization and transportation and lack of well-trained commanders. In the past, because of the country's long-time isolation, they did not know much about the development of artillery troops in the advanced countries. The difference was big, basically, they remained at the level of the 1960s and mid-1970s. At present, the artillery units have selected the first group of 90 persons for training in the USSR, and they are receiving initial training in China's artillery schools. The standard of the military cadres selected for learning in the USSR this time is very high. First, they must have served in the artillery units for at least 15 years; second, they must be around 40 years old; third, they must be cadres at or above regiment level. The training period is temporarily fixed for one year. The second group of personnel to be sent to the USSR for learning will be mainly selected from the artillery's general staff department; they will be massed by mid-August...As for the air force, up to early May the Peking Air Force has selected 350 pilots for training in the USSR; they are now staying at Peking Air Force Guest House for training. The conditions for selection are very demanding; they must be party members, below the age of 40, and officers on the active list and at the rank of first lieutenant or above…Over the years, the CCP has always maintained relatively good ties with North Korea. In recent years, when the CCP further strengthened ties with North Korea, it also developed economic relations with South Korea. The CCP's main principle is to maintain the current situation of two Koreas; now, because it wants to establish a three-nation (or five-nation) alliance, it grasps North Korea more tightly...Last year, Sino-Vietnamese relations experienced subtle changes. In order to ease up and further develop Sino-Vietnamese relations, particularly to establish the five-nation alliance with China and the USSR as the core, the CCP took the initiative in expressing goodwill to Vietnam. According to information, internally, both China and Vietnam have expressed the view that it is necessary to consider the overall situation and to look forward. The CCP will invite a delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam to the ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Of course, delegations from the communist parties of North Korea, the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Cuba, as well as other brotherly parties, will also be invited. In the next month, people will see how many little red cats - three, five, or more - will actually appear in the international arena...”[272] By 1991, relations between the Soviet Union and China reached the level of the 1950s. The newspaper Cheng Ming noted that:  “the CCP began to give publicity to Sino-Soviet friendship, praising the USSR's fraternal assistance to China in the past, and propagating the “great achievements” of the October Revolution. Large numbers of Soviet feature films have been shown. Over 20 kinds of Soviet reading materials have been reprinted, published and distributed among troops...It has been disclosed by sources that, in order to solve its economic problems, the USSR hopes China will purchase its new fighters, bombers and large transport planes, which have just been withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Working groups from the two sides have made contact on issues concerning purchasing the planes. It is disclosed that the CCP intends to build up a friendly relationship with the USSR. By so doing the CCP can show its support for the present domestic policies adopted by the CPSU (the conservatives) and, on the other hand, attain its goal of confronting Western countries including the USA. The CCP considers military cooperation between China and the USSR an invisible deterrent to both the USA and the Taiwan authorities...Since the beginning of this year, while strengthening trade relations between the two countries, China and the USSR have also stepped up military contacts. It is said that this is one of the CCP's new strategies since the Gulf war, which were worked out in consideration of its own international strategic position. Beginning in the second half of this year, China will send students to study in the USSR, especially military personnel, including pilots, who are expected to receive further training in the country. It has been disclosed by military people that a number of pilots, including fighter pilots at the lieutenant level, have been gathered for concentrated studies in preparation for studying in the USSR in June. According to an officer, China's air force is rather backward. This can be best exemplified by the poor quality of training provided for pilots. Prior to this year's Spring Festival, some Soviet pilots came to China to visit training sites and they all considered the quality of China's fighter pilots rather inferior. The pilots who are selected as the first to go to the USSR are expected to undergo a training course of one to one and a half years. It has been revealed that the Central Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee has decided to strengthen the building of China's air force to make preparations for future wars. It is one of the major tasks in the building of the air force to send pilots to the USSR for further study...”[273]

The Soviets and Chinese proudly displayed their desire for an alliance in their public statements as well. In a June 1991 meeting of CPSU and CCP delegations, General Secretary Jiang Zemin noted that to maintain friendly and good-neighbourly relations between China and the Soviet Union is in the interest of world peace and stability.”[274] In September 1991, several thousand Soviet KGB officers mysteriously “fled” to the PRC.[275] Why did China not repatriate these “fleeing” KGB officers who were supposedly disloyal to the established Soviet state as represented by Gorbachev? Were these KGB officers sent to assist China’s intelligence agencies under the cover story of “fleeing” after the failure of the “coup” against Gorbachev in August 1991?

Yang Shangkun called a meeting of the General Logistics Department, PLA General Staff and concerned State Council units in October 1991 and allegedly instructed them on the following steps regarding China’s consolidating its relations with anti-US states and using their friendly relations as a means of conducting a hostile policy against the Americans. It was admitted once again that the purpose of the Sino-Soviet alliance was to strategically checkmate the United States. Arms exports to friendly Third World countries would consolidate an anti-US alliance under the stewardship of the PRC. Yang reportedly stated: “Yang Shangkun's internal speech revealed that the CCP has continued to export arms after the Gulf war. Because of the Most-Favoured-Nation status problem, it has not been doing it overtly and openly but on the sly. The CCP thought it could use the Soviet Union as a chip by striking a pose of Sino- Soviet alliance in bargaining with the USA. A high-ranking official from the General Logistics Department revealed The CCP remains firm in exporting arms because it wants to counteract the USA and hostile Western forces. Obviously China's insistence on exporting arms to Pakistan, Iraq and other countries is aimed at opposing US power politics, apart from earning foreign exchange. This high-ranking official said ''Iran and Iraq enjoy outstanding status in the Middle East. Though Iraq has been defeated, China believes that in a few years' time it will come back. Iraq's Husayn will absolutely not bow his head. Our support for Iraq is our attempt to build anti-US bases in the Middle East.”[276]

The Sino-Russian Axis 1991-Present

After the “collapse” of the Soviet Union and the miraculous conversion of the CPSU leadership into democratic socialists and Russian nationalists, the Chinese and the new Yeltsin regime felt it to be a desirable foreign policy to continue military, industrial, and intelligence collaboration against what they perceived as the unipolar hegemony of the United States. Military collaboration continued, including alleged joint war planning and occupation plans against the United States itself. In 1992, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission set up the Russian Weaponry Purchasing Delegation, headed by Ding Henggao. “The delegation has four groups and 46 members, of whom 38 are weaponry experts from various arms and branches of services and relevant personnel of the operational department The CCP's State Council has already allocated 2bn dollars to the delegation. The Central Military Commission instructed that the delegation must purchase new and sophisticated types of weapons, that supplies of major spare parts must be available, and that they must suit China's strategy and environment.[277] According to a defecting GRU Colonel Stanislav Lunev, the Russian General Staff held a meeting in early 1992 in Moscow. According to Lunev, the Russian Generals “were still committed to fighting and winning a future nuclear war against America.  ‘The nuclear war plan is still on,’ he was told.   But there would be changes.  No longer would Russian troops be responsible for a follow-up invasion of the lower 48 states (U.S. mainland).  Russian forces would be responsible for occupying “Alaska and parts of Canada.”  The Chinese would occupy the lower 48 states.  In addition, certain Third World countries would be given ‘looting rights.’”[278] Perhaps these Third World countries would be the remaining communist and Islamic countries who were the recipients of Chinese and Russian manufactured armaments.

In September 1992, China and the Russian Federation restored intelligence cooperation in an agreement between the Russian GRU, SVR, and the Chinese PLA Military Intelligence Department. Western intelligence agencies were concerned that the two nations would launch joint efforts to steal technology from the Free World. SVR Chairman Yuri Kobaladze noted in an Orwellian, contradictory fashion that “We don't have constant enemies. We have national interests.”[279]  The evidence appears to point to these “national interests” as the reduction and elimination of the perceived superpower status of the United States. One is reminded of the Leninist strategy of utilizing short term contradictions within the West and its ruling classes to neutralize the power of the Free World. Sino-Russian international relations is contingent on whether the existence of the West assist the growth of Moscow and Beijing’s power. Hence, these interests become the elimination of short term enemies. Chinese dictator Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun came to the following conclusions for further pursuing closer Sino-Russian relations: “CCP issued two reports on the subject; Central Policy Research Centre report suggests "a new relationship with Russia" to form a "new strategy" against "US hegemonism" ; Military Research Office report suggests offering economic aid to Russia in exchange for sophisticated naval and air force equipment; peace on Sino-Russian border has saved 7bn renminbi in military expenses. Deng Xiaoping spoke to Chen Yun this spring in Hangzhou about ties with Russia. They had different opinions on the issue and suggested letting the "Political Bureau come to a decision on this based on the national situation and on long-term foreign strategy" . A report by the CCP Committee Central Policy Research Centre stresses that establishing a new type of relationship with Russia can be a new strategy to prevent US hegemonism from subverting China and intervening in the internal affairs of other Asian countries…"Concerning our country's active effort to establish and develop new cooperation ties with Russia" , says: Given the present global pattern, Russia and its CIS countries are not a threat to China and Asia. Russia's strategy for the time being is to try hard to speed up domestic reforms in a peaceful environment. After the violent change, Russian political structure is moving towards a relationship of friendly cooperation and development with China. The relationship between the two countries has ceased to be one of antagonism. Main contradictions in future development will still be those triggered by the intervention and infiltration of US hegemonism. The report points out that a stable and developing Russia promotes China's construction and reform, and will provide a peaceful and stable situation around us, something which US hegemonism opposes and hates to see. The report suggests that since Russia's economic reform has run into difficulty, China should provide whatever economic aid it can afford, including interest-free loans in renminbi ; low-interest, long-term loans in US dollars; help in light industrial, textile and food industries, labour, energy for development; and so on. China can sign long-term economic mutual accords, build an economic development and cooperation zone encompassing Russia, China, the CIS, Mongolia and South and North Korea. The report also suggests that the State Council and economic development organizations in provinces and cities invest in and develop Russia. The report also proposed that in developing cooperation, China and Russia should think in terms of generations of friendship between the two countries and the entire global strategic pattern, and sign a "friendly, cooperative and nonaggression pact”. The "MRO 93017" report entitled: "Proposals to build a new type of friendly and cooperative relationship with Russia under the new international environment, points out that China should offer Russia economic aid, especially in light industry, food and meat in exchange for the purchase of Russian high, advanced and sophisticated naval and air force equipment, and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian scientists and military experts. The two countries should sign a defence and cooperation treaty under the new environment. Border peace saves some 7bn [renminbi] in military expenses. The report points out that despite its weakened state and wait for restoration after violent change, Russia has a solid foundation in military, heavy and space industries, a large contingent of scientists and technologists, which overall is as strong as, if not stronger than, West European countries. The restoration and development of Russia is one focus for Western Europe's foreign strategy. Objectively it also contributes to peaceful construction in China and Asian countries. The report stresses that building a new type of relationship with Russia is also a new strategy to prevent US hegemonism from subverting China and intervening in the internal affairs of Asian countries.”[280]

Hard line elements of the Chinese Communist Party pursued the expansion of anti-US regimes and movements worldwide to counter the Americans. The State Council Research Office and the Overseas Information Office of the Chinese communists reportedly laid down a plan to link up with the communist parties in Eastern Europe and Russia; continue with Asian and Latin American Red regimes and movements to isolate the United States and its allies; and to support Islamic and Socialist countries in the Middle East; and to utilize China’s Mideast allies to utilize the petroleum weapon to hasten the downfall of the Americans. Cheng Ming outlined the details of the report in an 1992 article: “Through the State Council Research Office and the Overseas Information Office, the conservatives within the party jointly concocted a report, suggesting establishing an anti-American united front embracing China, North Korea and Vietnam, assisting the re-establishment of communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, supporting the Middle East countries' policies in opposition to the USA and the West, and wooing Third World countries to antagonize the USA. After the report was submitted to the central authorities, Qiao Shi, Li Ruihuan and others disagreed. In the middle 10 days of September last year, the report jointly concocted by the States Council Policy Research Office [as published] and the Overseas Information Office ''On the Establishment of a Three-Nation United Front Against US Hegemony'' was an ultra-leftist product.
Planning to Establish a China-North Korea-Vietnam United Front

The report suggests establishing a united front embracing China, North Korea and Vietnam, and opposing the subversion, intervention, infiltration and aggression of the Third World by the West headed by US imperialism and assisting and allying with the peoples and political parties of the countries all over the world subjected to the bullying and oppression, exploitation and aggression by imperialism to resist the hegemony and power politics pursued by the countries headed by the USA.

The report has the following six major points

Assisting the Re-establishment of Communist Parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

- Giving moral support for and financial assistance to the re-establishment and restoration of Marxist political parties in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

- Forming ties of allies based on mutual assistance with Pakistan and India and setting up an anti- aggression, anti-subversion joint military organ to contend with the USA.

- Under the five principles of peace and friendship, maintaining normal friendly relations with Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Burma, Singapore and Bangladesh and uniting with all the forces that can be united.

Supporting Anti-American Forces in the Middle East

- Supporting the Middle East countries' policies against the USA and the West, and supporting the countries in weakening the development of the Western economy by using petroleum as a weapon.

- Confronting Asia-wide the revival of Japanese militarism and Japan's economic aggression policy abroad, demanding Japan to compensate losses it caused during the second world war, and establishing a joint organization for Asia to claim compensation from Japan for the losses it suffered during the second world war.

- Supporting the countries, political parties and organizations in Latin America in opposing US imperialist aggression, intervention, sabotage and subversion and giving material support to Cuba, which is an anti-American outpost. The appearance of the draft report was the outcome of the ultra-left trend of thought within the party. As the world situation and pattern have changed, the conservatives within the CCP were compelled to change their tactics. They tried to unite with the surviving forces of the communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, gather together anti-democratic counter- revolutionary forces in the world, and draw over Third World countries to their side, create division and sow dissension between the latter and the Western countries including the USA by capitalizing on the contradictions between the two sides, in an attempt to turn China into ''an anti-American, anti-imperialist centre.”[281] Interestingly, the Chinese invited a delegation of the German Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS-the reconstituted SED) to meet with CCP officials of the Central Committee and the People’s Congress to explain the reasons for the GDR’s dissolution and the failure of the SED. Lothar Bisky and Gregor Gysi led the PDS delegation to Communist China.[282] Such a meeting was in line with China’s desire to solidify its alliance with the communist parties in Eastern Europe and thereby continue to gain agents of influence in that part of the world. One can also reasonably speculate that China would be gaining insights from the PDS as to how to continue totalitarian rule while continuing a more efficient, reformist communism. Hence, the CCP desired to avoid the mistakes that the East Germans and their Soviet allies made in late 1989 and 1990, when Gorbachev attempted to launch a campaign to restructure Eastern Europe by installing his protégés.

                The Russians continued to supply the Chinese communists with weapons, armament plants, and conducted massive joint exercises. In light of Col. Lunev’s revelations, these ambitious preparations were intended to intimidate the United States and challenge its status as the sole superpower in the post-Soviet world. In 1992, the Russians supplied the PRC with 24 Su-27 fighter planes. Moscow also agreed to set up a production line at the Shenyang Aircraft Industry Company to produce Su-27s on Chinese territory. China also indicated interest in purchasing the Russian Su-35 and Su-37. In 1999, the Chinese purchased 60 Su-30 combat planes from Russia, thus spending $2 billion.[283] Cooperation extended on the level of strategic nuclear war planning against the United States by the dawn of the Twenty First Century. In 2001, Russian troops joined in a Chinese PLA nuclear attack exercise conducted against the United States for assistance rendered to Taiwan. The exercises involved strategic bombing runs conducted by Russian Air Force Tu-22 and Su-27 planes near Japan. The Tu-22s were equipped with nuclear cruise missiles. The Sino-Russian exercise carried this sequence of events: “The Asia scenario began with a Chinese military attack on Taiwan that was followed by the use of U.S. ground troops" on the island, said one official. Next, China escalated the conflict by firing tactical nuclear missiles on the U.S. troops in Taiwan, prompting U.S. nuclear strikes on Chinese forces. Russian nuclear forces then threatened to use nuclear missile strikes on U.S. forces in the region, including strikes on troops in South Korea and Japan.”  Russia also fired ICBMs from land launchers and SLBMs from submarines in this exercise.[284] In August 2005, another Sino-Russian military exercise was conducted called “Peace Mission 2005.” The exercise will take place in Vladivostok, Russia, and on the Shandong Peninsula and nearby waters in China. Ten thousand army, navy, air force, marines, and support personnel were involved in “Peace Mission 2005.” The Hong Kong news agency Zhongguo Tongxun She noted that “Russian Army Deputy Commander Moltenskoy indicated on the 2nd that the Russian army will sent 1,800 officers and soldiers to participate in the joint military exercise. Participating Russian units include the Russian Pacific Fleet's large antisubmarine vessel Marshal Shaposhnikov, a large amphibious landing ship, a destroyer, and a company of marines, as well as 17 long-range military transport planes and fighter planes and one company of the Pskov 76th Airborne Division. . Participating Chinese and Russian forces will move to China's Jiaodong Peninsula and an area of the Yellow Sea. According to the scenario, a company of Russian paratroops will board transport planes and execute an airborne landing somewhere on the Jiaodong Peninsula, directly "into the enemy's rear area", in coordination with units of the Chinese army, navy, and air force. Meanwhile, a company of Russian marines will board a large amphibious landing ship and seize a beachhead in a sea area on the Jiaodong Peninsula. Phase three of the exercise will begin on 23 August. Russian frontline air forces will mobilize an Su-27SM fighter element to provide cover for two Russian long-range air forces Tu-95MS "Bear" strategic bombers and four Tu-22M3 "Backfire" long-range bombers as they fly over the Yellow Sea and use cruise missiles to attack targets on the sea surface. Because of misgivings on the part of certain countries about this joint military exercise, Russian Defence Minister Ivanov, who is in Vladivostok to inspect, indicated the other day that no third country has any reason whatsoever to worry about the joint military exercise which Russia and China will conduct in August. Russia and China are neighbours and strategic partners.”[285] A US official noted that “For the Chinese and the Russians, this is a message to the United States. They want to see our bases in Central Asia and presence in Asia cut back.”[286]

                As this paper demonstrated, Chinese-Russian/Soviet relations were marked by a consistent common goal of world communization and the downfall of the United States. There were many indications that the suddenly “converted” communists ruling the Russian Federation since 1992 were committed to the displacement of the United States. Moscow was willing to continue the alliance with China and other anti-US regimes to launch a hostile campaign against the United States. Any Sino-Soviet discord was either strategically placed disinformation or minor ideological differences that were healed openly in 1989 during the Gorbachev-Deng summit. It is especially crucial and relevant to discuss the history of this relationship, in light of the intensive Sino-Russian coordination through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the direct threat they pose to Asia and the Americas. China and Russia continue to collaborate on issues relating to the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, and Latin America when US interests are impaired. Our society continues to adhere to a worldview that is subscribed to by top policymakers. They tend to turn a deaf ear to the reality of the deceptive strategies employed by our enemies. Such policy and business elites view global interactions through the lens of naiveté and the expansion of access of the Western consumer goods to the globalized marketplace. Currently, a majority of mainstream commentators and elites view China as no longer a bona fide communist country and differentiate “moderate” versus “radical” Muslims. They fail to see that the enemies of the West will employ phony splits and facades to weaken Western world’s resolve. I would like to close with this biblical verse: “Beware of the false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravenous wolves” (Matthew. 7:15) This sums up the battle the good natured West continues to face with the deceptive mask of barbarism in all its forms.



[1] “First conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong” July 31, 1958 Accessed from Cold War International History Project Database http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034C198-96B6-175C-9AB8386F9E8C7DBD&sort=Collection&item=The%20Cold%20War%20in%20Asia

[2] Ibid.

[3] “Summary of a conversation with the Chairman of the CC CPC [Central Committee Communist Party of China] Mao-Tse Tung” on 14 October 1959 Accessed from Cold War International History Project http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/maoconv.htm

[4] “Soviet Display of Solidarity with China” The Times (London) February 16, 1963 page 8 and “Soviet-Red China Tie Still Strong, Khrushchev Says” Albuquerque Tribune February 15, 1963 page 1.

[5] “China Calls for Settling of Differences” The Times (London) March 14, 1963 page 9.

[6] Kellet-Long, Adam and Chipp, David. “Chou Says Sino-Soviet Ties Firm” as quoted in Congressional Record December 12, 1963 page A7572.

[7] “Chou Says Peking and Moscow Will Stand Together in a Crisis” New York Times February 4, 1964 page 2.

[8] “Mr. Chou Praises Russians” Times (London) November 8, 1960 page 12

[9] Budenz, Louis. The Bolshevik Invasion of the West (Bookmailer Linden NJ: 1966) page 75.

[10]Central Committee of the Communist Party of China “Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” March 22, 1966 Accessed http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/22march1966.htm

[11]  “Transcript of the discussions held with the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party which participated in the proceedings of the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party” 26 July 1965
Accessed From the Cold War International History Project

[12] No Place to Hide (VHS) 1982 Transcript Accessed http://www.realityzone.com/noplacetohide1.html

[13] Nyquist, J.R. “Russia and China’s Secret Collusion” June 7, 1999 WorldNetDaily Accessed http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19727

[14] Golitsyn, Anatoli. New Lies for Old (Clarion House: Atlanta GA 1984) page 182.

[15] Ibid, page 338

[16] Ibdi pages 345-346.

[17] Nyquist, Jeff. “Boycott China Anyway” WorldNetDaily April 16, 2001 Accessed http://www.wnd.com/index.php?pageId=8857

[18] Riesel, Victor. “Cooperation Uncovered: Alleged Russia-China Rift Revealed as Hoax” Marion Star August 22, 1962 page 23.

[19] Lane, Major General (Retired) T.A. “Sino Soviet Split An Opiate” The Post Standard January 20, 1965 page 15.

[20] Pelton, Robert. Traitors and Treason (LIGHTNING SOURCE UK LTD 2002) page 14

[21] Cline, Ray S. “China’s Conversion is Cause for Caution” World and I Issue1/1986 page 95

[22] “USSR, Red China Join Hands for World Communization, Dr. Ku Says” Central News Agency September 7, 1986


APRIL 3, 1985

[24] Safire, William “Sino-Soviet Friendship Not U.S. Plus” The Oregonian May 19, 1989 page B05

[25] Sieff, Martin “Events Re-link China, Soviets” Washington Times May 13, 1991 page A1

[26] “Red China Backs Soviet” New York Times September 3, 1961 page 3.

[27] “Malinovsky Hails Red China’s Army” New York Times August 1, 1961 page 3.

[28] “Peiping Backs Germans” New York Times October 8, 1961 page 2.

[29] “Malinovsky Hails China Army” New York Times August 2, 1964 page 38.

[30] Kim, Taeho and Gill, Bates. China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for Superb and Secret Weapons (SIPRI-Oxford University Press 1995) See Appendix.

[31] Peiris, Denzil. “Accelerated Development of Nuclear Weapons” The Times (London) September 28, 1976 page 9 and Minor, Michael S. “China’s Nuclear Development Program” Asian Survey June 1976 page 575.

[32] “Bomb Aid to China Linked to 2 Swiss; Cobalt Deals Cited” New York Times July 16, 1965 page 4.

[33] “Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Czechoslovak Ambassador Moravec” April 15, 1963 Accessed from Cold War International History Project http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=666C1841-DF40-D7B1-A96259481D90F2CD&sort=Coverage&item=Korea,%20Democratic%20People’s%20Republic%20of,%20(DPRK),%20North%20Korea

[34] Douglass, Dr. Joseph D. “Malfeasance in the Search for American POW/MIAs” Accessed from http://www.aiipowmia.com/reports/dglssmalfe.html

[35] Taylor, Henry J. “Behind the Pueblo Affair: How Red China and USSR Coordinate Espionage” Human Events March 2, 1968 page 12.

[36] “Chinese Reds in German Pact” New York Times August 6, 1962 page 8.

[37] “Soviet Mission Leaves Peiping” New York Times April 22, 1962. Page 38.

[38] “Peking to Purchase Airliners in Soviet” New York Times May 18, 1964 page 9.

[39] “Red China Shifts Trade From Bloc” New York Times June 7, 1964 page 16.

[40] “Moscow and Peking Sign ’65 Trade Pact” New York Times April 30, 1965 page 2

[41] “China, Soviet in Trade Pact” New York Times April 20, 1966 page 2.

[42] Schwartz, Harry. “Sino-Soviet Warmth: Blow to West Trade” New York Times October 12, 1969 page F1.

[43] “China and Czechoslovakia Sign Trade Accord for ‘69” New York Times June 17, 1969 page 19.

[44] “Soviet Trade Unit Arrives in Peking” New York Times November 13, 1970 page 5.

[45] Gwertzman, Bernard. “Moscow and Peking Plan to Triple Trade After New Low in 1970” New York Times March 24, 1971 page 15.

[46] “Soviet Trade Unit Arrives in Peking” New York Times November 13, 1970 page 5.

[47] “Chinese Airline Is Said to Get Soviet Jets” New York Times February 9, 1972 page 4.

[48] Durdin, Tillman. “Moscow Trading with Peking Rises” New York Times August 13, 1972 page 8.

[49] Hawtin, Guy. “China Decides to Take Part in Brno Trade Fair” The Times (London) March 9, 1972 page 17.

[50] “Soviet Chinese Trade Pact” New York Times July 24, 1975 page 9.

[51] “Communist Chinese Technicians in Cuba; Some Are Jet Pilots” Frederick Post November 4, 1960 page 1.

[52] “Red Chinese Torturing Invaders?” Arizona Republic April 24, 1961 page 2.

[53]Berrellez, Robert. “Chinese Reds Start Extortion Racket in Cuba” Stevens Point Daily Journal June 6, 1960 page 1.

[54] May, Donald. “Cuban Spy Activity in US Aired” Cedar Rapids Gazette January 7, 1961 page 1.

[55] “Defector Says Cuban Ships Take Chinese Arms to Hanoi” New York Times January 23, 1966 page 66.

[56] “Cuba Said to Push Opium Sales in the US” New York Times March 15, 1962 page 9.

[57] “China Said to Be Letting in Arms” The Times (London) April 8, 1965 page 12.

[58] “Russian Arms Sent Across China by Rail to Beat the American Blockade of N. Vietnam” Times (London) May 19, 1972 page 6.

[59] Morris, Robert. Our Globe Under Siege III (J&W Enterprises: Mantoloking NJ 1988) pages 21-22.

[60] “Ships Said to Go to China” New York Times May 31, 1972 page 2.

[61] Taylor, Henry J. “Soviets, Red China Make Guinea Mere Puppet State” The Argus November 30, 1970 page 8.

[62] Garrison, Lloyd. “Ghana Uncovers African Spy Network Set Up By Nkrumah With Red Aid.” New York Times June 10, 1966 page 20.

[63] Cooley, John K. “China and the Palestinians” Journal of Palestine Studies Winter 1972 pages 24-27.

[64] Lescaze, Lee. “China’s Foreign Policy Stresses United Front” quoted in June 9, 1971 Congressional Record page 19034.

[65] “2 High Chinese Aides at Soviet Fete in Peking” New York Times November 8, 1969 page 8.

[66] Shabad, Theodore. “Soviet Firm in Opposing 2-China Plan” New York Times September 22, 1971 page 4.

[67] Tanner, Henry. “Russian Derides US Plan on China” New York Times October 21, 1971 page 1.

[68] “Soviet, in First Comment, Hails UN Vote on China” New York Times October 26, 1971 page 14.

[69] “Soviet Embassy Honors Peking’s UN Delegate” New York Times November 6, 1971 page 12.

[70] Nyquist, J.R. “Russia and China’s Secret Collusion” June 7, 1999 WorldNetDaily Accessed http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=19727

[71] Sun Tzu and Giles, Lionel The Art of War Translated by Lionel Giles 1910 Accessed: http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi-e.html

[72] Golitsyn, pages 42-43.

[73] Chen, King C. “The Sino American Détente and the Third World” Chinese Law and Government Spring 1975

[74] Classified Chinese Communist Documents: A Selection (Institute for International Relations: National Chengchi University Republic of China 1978) pages 477-478 and 482

[75] Ibid, page 491.

[76] Kubek, Anthony. Red China Papers: What Americans Deserve to Know About U.S.-Chinese Relations New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House  1975 Accessed:


[77] Teng Hsiao-ping Speech Behind the Scenes of Red China’s Foreign Policy The Chan Wang Publication Service September 30, 1978 pages 1-5.

[78] Ibid, pages 6-11.

[79] Ibid, pages 12-19.

[80] Goodstadt, Leo “N. Korea Backs China Over Nixon Visit” Times (London) August 9, 1971 page 5

[81] “A COMMUNIST VIEW OF PRESIDENT NIXON’S VISIT TO RED CHINA CACC Newsletter September 15, 1971 Accessed: http://www.schwarzreport.org/Newsletters/1971/september15,71.htm

[82] Shen, Fang. “Article Discusses Whether the Special Zones Practise Capitalism” People’s Daily September 6, 1985

[83] Honglin, Li. “'People's Daily' Answers Critics of the Open-Door Policy” People’s Daily October 19, 1984

[84] Guodong, Hua. “'Ban Yue Tan' on Economic Zones and Socialism” Ban Yue Tan April 10, 1984

[85] Dixin, Xu. “Theoretical and Practical Problems in Developing Special Economic Zones” 'Shijie Jingji Daobao' July 27, 1981

[86] “Questions of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries” Red Flag May 12, 1982

[87] Fanzhang, Huang. On Taking a Correct Approach towards Bourgeois Economic Theories 'Guangming Ribao' December 15, 1983

[88] “Hongkong Journal on Disagreements Between Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and Deng Liqun” Cheng Ming June 9, 1984

[89] “Unnecessary and Impossible for China to Embark on the Capitalist Road” Renmin Ribao Overseas March 11, 1987

[90] “Hong Kong Paper Notes Soviet Bloc’s Gestures Towards China” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts October 13, 1983

[91] “The USSR’s Wish to Improve Relations with China” Radio Peace and Progress January 3, 1983

[92] Memorandum of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 31 May 1984. on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984 Accessed From Cold War International History Project Database http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF2837.pdf

[93] “Hong Kong Journal Reviews Reagan's China Visit: Assassination Plot” Cheng Ming June 6, 1984

[94] Ibid.

[95] Gelb, Leslie. “Soviet Reporting a Chinese Détente” New York Times March 20, 1983 Page 11

[96] “USSR and Vietnam Want Improved Relations with China” Radio Peace and Progress July 10, 1985

[97] “Meeting of Comrade Todor Zhivkov with Zhao Ziyang, Acting Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the State Council of China People’s Republic Beijing”, 6 May 1987 Accessed From Cold War International History Project http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034BD72-96B6-175C-9BB8DC1F59FAEAB4&sort=Subject&item=Todor%20Zhivkov

[98] “Talks with Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping in Beijing” May 7, 1987 Accessed from the Cold War International History Project http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034BD62-96B6-175C-9E795F8F67764934&sort=Collection&item=Bulgaria%20in%20the%20Cold%20War

[99] “Hungarian People's Army Art Ensemble in China” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts May 8, 1987

[100] “Chi Haotian Meets Hungarian Guests” Xinhua News Agency September 27, 1988

[101] “Defence Minister on ‘new phase’ in relations with Hungarian Army” Xinhua News Agency November 10, 1988

[102] “Military Attaché of GDR Embassy in China Gives Army Day Film Reception” Xinhua March 2, 1977

[103] “Military Attaché of GDR Embassy in China Gives Army Day Cocktail Party” Xinhua March 2, 1978

[104]Chinese Army Day marked in Berlin East German News Agency August 6, 1979

[105] “GDR Army Day Celebrations; China” New China News Agency March 7, 1980

[106] “Chinese Deputy CGS Attends Peking Reception” New China News Agency March 4, 1981

[107] “Chinese Army Day marked in GDR” East German News Agency August 2, 1982

[108] “GDR Army Anniversary Marked in BeijingXinhua News Agency March 1, 1983

[109] “Democratic German Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua General Overseas News Service March 1, 1985

[110] “Other Visitors; German Democratic Republic” East German News Agency October 20, 1987

[111] “Berlin School Named After Renowned Chinese Marshal” Xinhua June 10, 1987

[112]Army Chief of General Staff Meets GDR VisitorsXinhua May 28, 1988

[113]Chief of Political Department of GDR Army in Beijing” Xinhua General News Agency September 26, 1989

[114] “Other Visitors; GDR” East German News Agency November 1, 1989

[115] “GDR Guests Honored in Beijing” Xinhua News Service November 13, 1989

[116] “Czechoslovak Military Attaché Gives Army Day Reception in Beijing” Xinhua General News Service OCTOBER 6, 1979

[117] “Czech Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua General News Service OCTOBER 6, 1981

[118] “Czechoslovak Army Day Marked at Beijing Reception” Xinhua General News Service OCTOBER 5, 1984

[119] “Czechoslovak People's Army Day Reception” Xinhua October 5, 1988

[120]Czechoslovak Top Leaders Meet PLA Senior Officer” Xinhua General Overseas News Service NOVEMBER 2, 1989

[121] “PLA Delegation’s Visit to Czechoslovakia” Xinhua September 18, 1990

[122] “Cuban Military Delegation in Peking” Xinhua August 24, 1989

[123] “Chinese Army Chief Meets Cuban Military Delegation” Xinhua April 30, 1990

[124]Chinese Military Goodwill Delegation Makes Stopover in Bucharest” Xinhua JUNE 9, 1978

[125] “Chinese, Romanian Military Leaders Meet” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service JULY 14, 1984

[126] “Chinese Public Security Minister Meets Romanian Delegation” Xinhua August 7, 1989

[127] “Chinese Army Group Ends Visit to Romania” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

[128] “Romanian Defense Ministry Celebrates Chinese Army Day” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service JULY 27, 1990

[129] “Chinese Vice-President Meets Romanian Chief of Staff” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service NOVEMBER 10, 1991

[130] “Chinese Agencies Lose a Friend” Intelligence Newsletter November 12, 1998

[131]PLA Unit Holds Meeting to Celebrate Yugoslav People's Army Day” Xinhua DECEMBER 20, 1978

[132] “Qin Jiwei calls on Yugoslav Defense Minister in Belgrade” Xinhua MAY 11, 1983

[133] “PLA Chief of General Staff Visits Yugoslavia” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service JULY 22, 1984

[134] “Chinese Army Anniversary Marked in Belgrade” Yugoslav News Agency August 7, 1985

[135] “Yugoslavia Marks Chinese Army Day” Xinhua JULY 28, 1987

[136] “OTHER VISITORS” Tanjug October 20, 1988

[137] “Speeches by DPRK Armed Forces Minister and Chinese Counterpart” Pyongyang Home Service May 21, 1988

[138] “DPRK Army Leader Feted in Beijing” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service AUGUST 25, 1989

[139] “Kim Il Sung Receives Chinese PLA Delegation” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service APRIL 23, 1990

[140] “Polish Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua General News Service OCTOBER 12, 1983

[141] “Chinese Defence Minister Meets Polish Military Delegation” Xinhua October 21, 1989

[142]Chinese Army Day Marked in Poland Ambassador Appointed” Polish Press Agency August 2, 1990

[143] “Bulgarian Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua General News Service SEPTEMBER 24, 1981

[144] “Bulgarian Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua General News Service SEPTEMBER 24, 1980

[145] “VISITORS; Bulgaria” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency September 30, 1989

[146] “Chinese PLA Visiting Group Arrives in Bulgaria” Xinhua General News Service SEPTEMBER 15, 1989

[147]Chinese Military Visiting Group Ends Visit to Bulgaria” Xinhua General Overseas News Service SEPTEMBER 23, 1989

[148]“ PLA Leader Meets Bulgarian Defence Minister”  The Xinhua General Overseas News Service OCTOBER 27, 1991

[149] “Soviet Military Attaché in Peking Gives Reception to Mark Soviet Army Day” Xinhua February 23, 1977

[150] “Soviet Military Attaché Gives Army Day Reception in Peking” Xinhua February 24, 1978

[151] “Soviet Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua February 23, 1982

[152] “Soviet Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua February 23, 1983

[153] “Soviet Army Day Marked in Beijing” Xinhua February 22, 1985

[154][154] “Soviet Army Day Marked at Embassy Reception” Xinhua February 23, 1987

[155] “Soviet Army Day Wreath Laying in China” Radio Peace and Progress February 27, 1982 and “Soviet Army Day; China” New China News Agency February 26, 1980

[156] “Soviet Union Reportedly Ready to Hold Nuclear Talks with China” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 19, 1987

[157] “Soviets, Chinese Sign Trade Pact” Washington Post August 8, 1979 page A15

[158] Brown, Phil. “China, Soviet Union Sign New Trade Pact” Associated Press June 6, 1980

[159] Thomson, Robert. “POLISH LEADER'S CHINA VISIT MARKS WARMING OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS” Sydney Morning Herald (Australia)September 29, 1986

[160] Abrams, Jim. “Visit by Poland's Jaruzelski Signals New Chinese-East Bloc Ties” The Associated Press September 28, 1986

[161] Redmond, Ron. “Deng Endorses Renewed Sino-East German Ties” United Press International October 23, 1986

[162] Durdin, Tillman. “The China Card Has Dealt Itself Back Into the Soviet Deck” San Diego Union April 27, 1986

[163] Doder, Dusko. “Moscow, Peking Sign Pact” Washington Post July 11, 1985

[164] “Purchase of Aircraft From the USSR” Xinhua July 22, 1985

[165] “China Imports Soviet Helicopters” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts May 28, 1985

[166] “USSR Reportedly Proposes Nuclear Facilities Exports to China” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 11, 1986

[167] “Delegation To Be Sent to USSR to Study Nuclear Power Stations” Xinhua April 3, 1986

[168] “CCP Delegation’s Visit to Portugal: Contact With Portuguese Communists” Xinhua June 28, 1985

[169] “Portuguese Communist Party Leader in China” Xinhua December 11, 1986

[170] “British Communist Party Delegation in China” Xinhua May 26, 1986

[171] “South African Communist Party Delegation in China” Xinhua September 11, 1986

[172] Del Vecchio, Mark “U.S., Chinese Communist Parties End 20-Year Split” United Press International June 22, 1988


[174] “Chinese and Canadian Communist Parties Resume Ties” Xinhua April 21, 1987

[175] Fisher, Allyn. “Israeli Communist: China On The Road To Ties With Israel” The Associated Press July 15, 1987

[176] “Jiang Zemin Meets Lebanese Communist Party Leader” Xinhua February 16, 1990

[177] “Indian CPI Delegation in China” Xinhua October 22, 1991 and “Communist Party of India Delegation Visiting China” Xinhua July 24, 1991.

[178] “CCP Expands Contacts with Foreign Political Parties” Xinhua December 29, 1983.

[179] “Chinese View of the Western Peace Movement” Xinhua April 23, 1983

[180] “China’s Support for European Peace Movement: Freedom for Writers” Xinhua October 13, 1983

[181]Peking Reception for US Peace Group” Xinhua January 9, 1984

[182] “Finnish Peace Union Delegation in China” Xinhua October 26, 1984

[183] “Chinese Peace Delegation in USA” Xinhua July 14, 1984

[184] “British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Honored at Beijing Reception” Xinhua November 3, 1984

[185] “PRC Peace Meeting Told of Need to Fight Superpower Hegemony” Xinhua July 30, 1984

[186] “China Calls for Nuclear Cuts” New York Times July 29, 1984 page 14.

[187] “Association for Peace and Disarmament Established” Xinhua June 8, 1985

[188] “CCP General Secretary on China’s Opposition to Arms Races” Xinhua June 11, 1985

[189] “Ji Pengfei Expresses Support for European Peace Movement” Xinhua April 12, 1985

[190] “Hu Yaobang on Relations With Communist Parties” Xinhua May 25, 1985

[191] “CCP Official Reviews Contacts With Foreign Parties” Xinhua September 17, 1984

[192] “Peace-Children’s Hope” Xinhua June 6, 1985

[193] “Tutu Begins Visit to China” Associated Press August 8, 1986

[194] “Chinese Peace Delegation Leaves for USA” Xinhua March 14, 1986

[195] “Chinese Peace Expert Leaves for Visits to Poland, Hungary, and the GDR” Xinhua January 14, 1986

[196] “Zhou Peiyuan Meets US Visitors” Xinhua December 1, 1987

[197] “British Fabian Society Delegation in China” Xinhua March 11, 1987

[198] “CPPCC Vice Chairman Meets US Guests” Xinhua October 17, 1987

[199] NPC Vice Chairman Meets US Republicans” Xinhua April 14, 1989

[200] “Huang Hua Meets US Heritage Foundation Vice President” Xinhua March 23, 1987

[201] “Wang Shoudao Meets Guest from Club of Rome” Xinhua November 4, 1982

[202] Jianzhi, Zhang “China’s Nuclear Strategy of Limited Self Defensive Counter-Attack” Jiefangjun Bao April 3, 1987

[203] Morris, page 27.

[204] “Despite FX Cancellation: Red China Undermines US Foreign Policy” Human Events March 6, 1982 page 186-187.

[205] “Angolan Move Towards Establishing Relations with China” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts January 23, 1979

[206] “PRC Trade Unions Support Angola” New China News Agency August 26, 1982

[207] “China and Angola Sign Cooperation Agreements” Xinhua October 24, 1988

[208] “Chinese CP Delegation  in Angola Meeting with Mbinda” Luanda Home Service January 13, 1988

[209] “Fatah" Delegation's Visit to China and N Korea” New China News Agency August 28, 1980

[210] “Yasir Arafat's Visit to China” Xinhua May 8, 1984

[211] “PLO OFFICIAL IN CHINA TALKS WITH LI PENG AND ZHAO ZIYANG” Peking Home Service February 17, 1989

[212] “PLO LEADER QADDUMI IN CHINA” Xinhua August 28, 1991

[213] “China Boosts Aid to PLO, Denounces U.S.” The Associated Press December 4, 1983

[214] “SWAPO Delegation in China: Military Aid” Xinhua February 2, 1983

[215] Mann, Jim. “Nicaragua Chief Says China to Give $20 Million in Aid” Los Angeles Times September 15, 1986 page 2

[216] Minson Adam and Erikson, Daniel P. “Cuba and China” Accessed: http://www.hemisferio.org/documentos/cuba.and.china.pdf

[217] Del Mundo, Fernando. “Government thwarts rebels arms deal with China, North Korea” United Press International November 12, 1987

[218] Southerland, Daniel “China Lauds N. Korea for its Soviet Ties” Washington Post September 12, 1985 page A25.

[219] “USSR’s Consistent Support for One China” Radio Peace and Progress May 28, 1982

[220] “China's Top Leader Criticizes Star Wars” Associated Press August 2, 1985

[221] “USSR Said to Have Stopped Jamming of Russian Broadcasts From China” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts November 6, 1986

[222] Gill, R. Bates. Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns, and Prospects in the New World Order (Praeger: Westport CT and London 1992) pp. 48-78.


[224] Speech of Nicolae Ceausescu at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders May 29, 1987 Accessed from Cold War International History Project http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034BB5F-96B6-175C-9F77A7C3B2C5A5D4&sort=Collection&item=Warsaw%20Pact


[226] “GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN PEKING” Moscow Home Service May 19, 1989

[227] Ibid.

[228] Ibid.


[230] Bovin, A. “SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT HAILED AS MOST IMPORTANT EVENT OF 1989” Izvestiya February 16, 1989

[231] Ovchinnikov,  Vsevolod . “ASPECTS OF SOVIET-CHINESE NORMALISATION” Pravda February 16, 1989

[232] “Renmin Ribao Editorial on Summit and Communique” Xinhua May 20, 1989

[233] “Voice of the Khmer Interviews Defecting Phnom Penh Diplomat” Voice of the Khmer October 31, 1989

[234] Marcy, Sam. “The Significance of the Sino-Soviet Summit”  Workers World May 25, 1989 Accessed http://www.workers.org/marcy/cd/sam89/1989html/s890525.htm

[235] “Nhan Dan Welcomes Normalisation of Sino-Soviet Relations” Nhan Dan May 22, 1989

[236] “U.S.-RED CHINESE TIES SEEN UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE SOON” Central News Agency-Taiwan August 27, 1989

[237] “China Decries USA's '' 'Peaceful' Subversion'' in Nicaragua”  Renmin Ribao September 21, 1989

[238] “'Renmin Ribao' condemns US support for Nicaraguan opposition” Renmin Ribao October 30, 1989

[239] Zhong, Li “Renmin Ribao Article Critical of US Attitude in Central America” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 14, 1989

[240] “Army Paper Condemns US Interference in Panama” Jiefangjun Bao August 16, 1989

[241] “Peking Radio Criticizes US Interference in Panama” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts November 8, 1989

[242] “FURTHER REACTION TO THE US INVASION OF PANAMA” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 28, 1989

[243] “Reaction to the US action in Panama” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts December 22, 1989

[244] “China Tilts Toward Soviet Bloc” Washington Times September 26, 1989

[245] “GDR People’s Chamber Statement on China” ADN June 9, 1989


[247] “The Chinese Secret Service: From Mao to the Olympic Games” Intellibriefs March 14, 2008 Accessed: http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/03/chinese-secret-service-from-mao-to.html

[248] “Chinese Paper Views New East German Leader’s Tasks” Liaowang November 16, 1989

[249] “Hong Kong Paper on CCP Document Explaining the Eastern Europe Situation” Ching Jih Pao December 15, 1989

[250] “Chinese Leader’s Talks with Erich Honecker” ADN October 13, 1989

[251] “NPC Leader Meets Czechoslovak Guests” Xinhua November 4, 1989

[252] “CCP Delegation Leaves for GDR” Xinhua November 9, 1989

[253] “Chinese Peace Delegation in USSR” Soviet Television September 22, 1989

[254] Tyson, Ann Scott. “Warming Up to the 'Big Polar Bear’” Christian Science Monitor February 6, 1989 page 3

[255] “China Establishment of Factories in USSR” Zhongguo Xinwen She July 21, 1989

[256] “China Agreement on Exchange of Goods for 1990” Xinhua January 4, 1990

[257] “Number of Foreigners in GDR” East German News Agency February 1, 1990

[258] “First PRC-USSR-Eastern Europe Trade Fair” Xinhua June 13, 1990

[259] “China Interested in Trade with Eastern Germany” East German News Agency October 4, 1990

[260] “Military and Foreign Affairs Delegation to USSR” Xinhua November 15, 1989

[261] Twining, David Thomas. Beyond Glasnost: Soviet Reform and Security Issues pages 135-136.

[262] “General Xu Xin Meets Soviet Veterans” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service JULY 24, 1990

[263] Twining, page136.

[264] “China to Purchase 24 Soviet Fighter Jets” Japan Economic Journal May 25, 1991 page 14.

[265] Parker, Jeffrey K. “China’s Price for Aid to Moscow: Cheap Fighters” United Press International March 14, 1991

[266] “Chinese Military Leader Ends USSR Visit” Xinhua General Overseas News Service AUGUST 12, 1991

[267] “PLA General Staff Deputy Chief Meets Soviet Visitors” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service JULY 10, 1991

[268] “Chinese Army Chief Meets Soviet Deputy Defence Minister” The Xinhua General Overseas News Service JUNE 21, 1991

[269] Remnick, David “Moscow TV Shutters Glasnost in Coverage of Beijing Protests” Washington Post May 18, 1989 page A38

[270] Stroilov, Pavel “The Gorbachev Files” Spectator March 26, 2011 Accessed: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_20110326/ai_n57158714/

[271] “Soviets Extradite Chinese Pilot Who Wanted to Defect to U.S.” Associated Press August 29, 1990



[274] “Russian Party Delegation in China Discusses Ties and Socialism” Xinhua July 1, 1991

[275] “KGB Agents Seek Early Retirement in China” The Independent September 5, 1991 page 1.


[277] “China Sets Up Body to Buy Russian Weapons” Cheng Ming July 6, 1992

[278] Nyquist, Jeffrey R. “Chinese Paratroopers in California?” Accessed http://www.tldm.org/news4/chineseinvasion.htm

[279] Gertz, Bill “Russia, China Sign Pact Restoring Intelligence Ties” Washington Times October 21, 1992 page A7

[280] “CCP Think-Tank Proposes a New Type of Relationship with Russia” Cheng Ming November 10, 1993


[282] “German PDS Officials to Travel to China to Explain Failure of Communism in GDR” German Press Agency March 25, 1993

[283] “Russian Purchases Boost China’s Air Strength” Yazhou Zhoukan August 28, 1999.

[284] Gertz, Bill. “Russian Forces Help China in Mock Conflict; Nuclear War on U.S. Troops” Washington Times April 30, 2001 page A1

[285] Hui, Yang. “Hong Kong Agency Gives Details of China-Russia Military Exercise” Zhongguo Tongxun She August 2, 2005

[286] Gertz, Bill. “War Games Seen As 'Message'; China-Russia Military Exercises Worry U.S. Officials” Washington Times August 17, 2005 page A01