To members of the
International Media
Dear Sirs:
I have become very disappointed with the poor amount and sometimes
unjust coverage given to the TRUE current Venezuelan political
and economic crisis, as well as the slanted view presented in the
American media regarding this extremely important matter. In the next
few paragraphs, I will present some facts that I hope will give a
different view of what is generally presented in American newspapers
and broadcasts. I dearly hope that this will give a clearer sense of
what is truly happening in Venezuela and shed some light on the
indescribable damage that President Hugo Chavez has caused on the
country's people and institutions. Please verify all these facts with
the U.S. Embassy in Caracas and with your colleagues so that the truth
will come to light and the American and Western countries will be
informed of the intense repression and extreme fear currently lived by
most Venezuelans. It is of the utmost importance that people know of
this and take action, so that repressive, authoritarian regimes do not
continue to spread in Latin America. This is a particularly pressing
issue given the desperation currently lived by most Venezuelans for
the fear that they will fall hostage to a repressive, communist, and
authoritarian regime for which they did not vote and the indescribable
cost to the country resulting from the current month-old strike, which
is estimated at more than $50 million per day in foregone oil sales
alone. The people are holding this strike, sacrificing short term
sales at an incredible personal cost, in hopes that the current regime
does not take away their long term dreams of raising their children in
a free, democratic country with ample opportunities for all.
Note: In order to simply present the facts and let your
respected, serious media draw insightful analysis and logical
conclusions, I will use brief bullet points (albeit each one could
easily fill an entire chapter of a book.)
1) Establishment of the so-called "Bolivarian
Circles" by the government with the sole purpose of
causing terror in the cities to lower the morale of the opposition and
incite them to emigrate. These groups are being funded with government
money and are also provided with arms purchased by the state.
Moreover, these terrorist groups allegedly receive training from Cuba.
This is all being organized by Freddy Bernal, a close Chavez ally and
mayor of Caracas’s Libertador District.
2) Lack of free speech and persecution of prominent
businessmen, politicians, and reporters as evidenced by the
fact that their telephone lines are intervened and they are followed
by the Military Police. Also, many of these people were subject to
house raids by the Government (specific examples include a former
Minister of the Exterior, a former high ranking Army General (Gen.
Manuel Rosendo), and many other officers who recently defected from
the army.) Moreover, these people constantly receive threats of
kidnapping and murder not only for themselves but also for their
families.
3) Strong links by Chavez to several regimes considered
by Western States to promote terrorism and/or deny citizens
of basic human rights. The most notorious of these people include:
a) Fidel Castro: He is Chavez's strongest advocate
and closest advisor, and a large beneficiary of Venezuelan oil. In a
deal that strongly favours Cuba, Chavez is exchanging oil for services
provided by Cuba. These include military strategic and tactical
advice, sport coaching, and medical training. In addition, many people
claim that as many as 4,000 Cubans are infiltrated in Venezuela - even
in the military - to provide the Venezuelan government with
Soviet-style intelligentsia and advice. In addition, even Castro
himself admitted that "the Cuban revolution cannot survive if
Chavez's 'Bolivarian Revolution' fails." Chavez’s admiration
for Castro is indisputable. The danger lies in the fact that Chavez is
pushing his own personal agenda to establish a communist regime in
Venezuela so that the country that he is representing can live like
Cuba in a “Sea of Happiness” (the way Chavez described Cuba during
one of his speeches at a university on that Island) even though the
vast majority of Venezuelans don’t support that type of system.
b) FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia):
Venezuelan General Gonzalez Gonzalez, who recently defected from the
Venezuelan Army, challenged Chavez on April 10th to deny that these
groups, which are considered by the Bush Administration to be
terrorists, do not operate in Venezuelan territory. There is strong
evidence, including videos released by Venezuelan TV station
Globovision, to support these claims. Moreover, Chavez has admitted
dealing with FARC and ELN (Colombia's second largest guerrilla group)
behind that country's back. The alleged link between the Chavez's
Administration and the Colombian guerrillas is General Rodriguez
Chacin, Chavez's former Interior and Justice Minister (Secretary) and
a citizen who is currently holding multiple identities to carry on
with his corruption deals.
c) Saddam Hussein: Chavez was the first head of state
to pay an official visit to the leader of a country belonging to what
Bush called "the axis of evil." In addition, Freddy Bernal
was spotted in Iraq in April. Moreover, the pilot of the presidential
plane, who recently defected from the army and is seeking asylum in
the U.S., presented evidence of intelligence exchanges between the two
leaders.
d) Vladimiro Montesinos: Alberto Fujimori's right
hand was found hiding in Venezuela after Peru's government mounted a
covert operation to find him and bring him to justice for committing
very serious crimes, including crimes against humanity. Many people
believe that Chavez provided Montesinos with logistical support to
enter Venezuela and remain there illegally.
4) Constant threats to the public made through his weekly
“Alo Presidente" radio broadcast. These programs,
officially intended to inform Venezuelans of new policies, is actually
used by Chavez to intimidate and harass. In them, Chavez tells people
that those who revolt against him will see the full force of the
Military's arms, face a myriad of problems, and be subject to intense
pressure from the (people's) government. It was in one of these
programs, for instance, that he removed several PDVSA's top executives
after they threatened to organize a national strike in April 2002
(which they did and eventually lead to the April 11 events.) In
addition, Chavez constantly says in these programs that he will rule
Venezuela until 2021. More importantly, though, he gives explicit
approval to his followers to literally fight the street battle –with
their lives if necessary – against the “oligarchs” (the term he
uses for people against his “Bolivarian Revolution”) by using
terror.
5) Diplomatic clashes with the U.S. This has been
building up since Chavez first came to power, given his radical,
left-wing and authoritarian ideals. However, two events heavily
strained their relationship even further. The first occurred in
December of 1999 when Chavez returned an American ship full of
supplies and humanitarian aid to help in the State of Vargas, which
had just experienced mudslides that left more than 20,000 dead and
scores more homeless. The second diplomatic impasse occurred after
Chavez heavily criticized the U.S. in one of his "Alo Presidente"
programs for America's response in Afghanistan after the September 11
terrorist attacks. The U.S. has been very quiet about the turmoil in
Venezuela. However, if the U.S. does go to war with Iraq, wouldn’t
it want to have a steady, close supplier of oil? Without a doubt, the
managers at PDVSA have a Western mindset. This is precisely the reason
why they are holding the oil strike: to preserve the meritocracy and efficiency
of the company. It is Chavez, with his own political agenda, that is
trying to distance PDVSA from the U.S. (There are reports alleging
that he is trying to sell U.S.-based and PDVSA-owned CITGO to Nigeria).
6) Lack of check and balances in the government: this
is a result of most of the public powers and institutions being
elected by Chavez at his will. These include the Supreme Court judges
(Tribunal Supremo de Justicia), the Secretary of Justice (Fiscal
General), People's Defense Attorney (Defensor del Pueblo), and members
of Congress (Asamblea Nacional). Moreover, when government officials
speak out against the Administration for reporting undeniably
unethical, patently wrong, or lavishly corrupt behaviour, they are
quickly replaced and are subject to a national campaign to tarnish
their reputations. Specific examples of the lack of sovereign
institutions include:
a) The nonexistent investigations by the Fiscalia General
regarding the deaths of more than 15 people that were peacefully
protesting on April 11, 2002 against the Government. This is
appalling considering that there is clear footage of the deaths and
the gunmen, who were shooting indiscriminately upon the unarmed crowd
from a bridge called “Puente Llaguno” near the Presidential
Palace. After the gunmen were identified, they were detained but soon
released for “lack of evidence.” As if this injustice were not
enough, members of the “Bolivarian Circles” recently attacked
(physically!) Mr. Mohamed Merhi, the father of one of the victims, for
holding a hunger strike in front of the Supreme Court to protest the
tardiness of the investigations.
b) A similar event occurred on December 6, 2002 at Plaza
Altamira, which has become the meeting point for the
opposition. During a peaceful protest to show support for more than
140 members of the military who have been at this square for more than
two months in “civil disobedience”, an identified Portuguese
citizen (whose first name is Joao) and follower of Chavez shot at
point-blank upon the unarmed crowd. Even though this happened in front
of thousands of people, the investigations by the Fiscalia General are
stalled.
c) The double standard by Chavez in the way in which he treats
the Supreme Court Justices. The members of the Judicial Power
were chosen by the current Government, but some of them have upset the
Government recently for voting against Chavez. In particular, the
Supreme Court found late last year that, in fact, no coup had occurred
in April. After issuing their finding, Chavez started a national
campaign to investigate the credentials of the Justices that had voted
in this way. In a democracy, it would be clear if a Justice possessed
the necessary education and certificates to hold such an important
job. It would be unthinkable to have people with forged documents
holding these posts. Moreover, shouldn’t it be necessary to
investigate the credentials of ALL the Justices, not just the ones of
those who voted against Chavez?
d) The Government’s unconstitutional takeover of the Policia
Metropolitana from Alfredo Peña, who is the Mayor of a large
section of Caracas called “Alcaldia Mayor”. This police force
constitutionally falls under the jurisdiction of the Mayor but because
they protect opposition marches, Chavez took them over with the
military. It’s as if Clinton had taken over the New York Police
Department from Giuliani for belonging to a different political party.
As unimaginable as this sounds, exactly this happened in Venezuela.
After the Supreme Court held this takeover to be unconstitutional,
Chavez slowly returned the police force to Peña but without the
high-caliber arms! Legally, Chavez is accepting the independence of
powers, but in reality he is not.
7) Unclear elections after his initial sweeping victory.
The many elections since December 1999 have used the services of INDRA,
a Spanish company. Moreover, the CNE (Centro Nacional Electoral), the
organization that oversees elections, was appointed by Chavez himself.
In addition, Luis Miquilena, who until recently was the Minister of
the Interior and is Chavez’s former political mentor, admitted
receiving illegal funds from a large Spanish bank to finance
Chavez’s elections.
8) Corruption, irresponsible spending, and lack of managerial
capabilities of many government officials. While Chavez
heavily emphasized the rooting out of corruption in his campaigns and
the increase of efficiency in government, his administration has done
the exact opposite, perhaps to a degree never experienced before in
Venezuela. There are two noteworthy cases.
a) Plan Bolivar 2000, a social plan that utilized
military personnel to run markets, paint schools, and build roads.
However, it is widely known that top military brass took vast sums of
money to their personal accounts and never faced a trial because the
Secretary of Justice is aligned with the government.
(b) Purchase of a new, unnecessary presidential airplane that
cost the nation more than U.S. $65 million while 80% of the
population lives in poverty. The pilot of this plane who recently
defected from the Army has told of many instances where the
country’s planes and other assets are used for personal trips by the
Government’s friends and family. In addition, many security breaches
occur during such trips (e.g. people with loaded guns are allowed to
board the plane and unqualified personnel are allowed to operate it).
9) Dubious approval of the new Constitution. Some
people claim that the new Constitution, which was written during 1999
by the Chavez government and subject to a national referendum, was
modified after the people cast their votes to approve it. In other
words, the Constitution that is currently in place was not the one
that was approved by popular vote. Regardless of that, the current
constitution contains Article 350, which allows citizens to stage
civil disobedience against the Government for issues of national
importance. It is precisely this article, which was drafted by Chavez
to justify his coup in 1992, that the members of the opposition are
invoking. Now that his own constitution is being used against him, he
is rallying to amend it in order to “perfect it.”
10) Unprofessional leadership and corruption of the armed
forces. This has been Chavez's action that has probably taken
the highest toll on society because in Latin America, it is necessary
for a President to have the support of the Armed Forces; else she or
he runs the risk of a coup d'etat. During Chavez's tenure, he has
promoted an unjustifiably high number of his former Military Academy
classmates to posts, regardless of their possession of managerial or
technical skills for the job. Some of these institutions include PDVSA,
SENIAT (the tax-collection agency), and others. Moreover, constant
salary increases for the military and accelerated promotions are
commonplace nowadays. Responsible, traditional officers have been
forced out for voicing their opposition to Chavez's promotion policies
and close links to the Colombian guerrilla (while knowing that doing
so would alienate their military careers forever). At the moment, many
institutional officers, who strongly believe in the force as a
disciplined, apolitical body whose purpose is to protect the country
and its citizens, have defected to show their disapproval of the
Army’s decaying institutionalism and increasing political
involvement.
11) Persecution and harassment of media reporters and staff.
This is done through the “Bolivarian Circles" by order of
Freddy Bernal. These groups go in motorcycles and loot, burn, and
physically attack anything or anyone associated with the media groups,
which have continually showed concern for the government's
increasingly autocratic behavior. This repression was clear on the
night of April 12, when Chavez came back to power, and the media was
cornered in a storm of bullets and flying bottles.
12) Signs of the use of indiscriminate force against the
opposition. During the April 11 civilian opposition march,
which drew more than 500,000 people in Caracas alone, a reporter
caught footage of armed men (who were members of Bernal's "Bolivarian
Circles") firing their semi-automatic handguns upon protesting
civilians. This resulted in the confirmed death of 15 people and a
hundred of injured more. In addition, the National Guard recently
physically and psychologically tortured crew members of the Ship
“Pilin Leon”, a gasoline cargo vessel that joined the oil strike.
13) Use of state funds to draw support to Chavez's cause.
Chavez's core followers, who are generally members of the poor class,
are given hundreds of thousands of bolivares (approx. 1500 Bs/US
dollar), food, drinks, and clothing to show up at government-sponsored
marches and speeches. The opposition, on the other hand, shows up
spontaneously and is constantly physically attacked by these
followers. Moreover, the government frequently categorizes
opposition-sponsored marches as illegal for lacking the necessary
permits. It is important to note that opposition marches have drawn in
many occasions more than one million people in Caracas alone even
while the Government has implemented all possible tactics to sabotage
them (e.g. blocking main highways with sixteen-wheeler trucks, hiring
taxicabs to drive empty around Caracas to show “busy” streets,
declaring several areas in Caracas as “Security Zones” effectively
blocking free access to them, etc.)
I hope that the aforementioned reasons will be persuasive enough to
draw your attention to investigate these
pressing matters immediately. The people of Venezuela deserve
a fair coverage of this crisis as they are living in constant terror
and intolerable oppression. If left untouched, I fear that
Chavez's regime would consolidate itself even further, and perhaps
form a stronger alliance with Cuba and Iraq, which would destabilize
the region even further. This would wreck havoc the previous
conciliatory efforts by Western civilized states to promote long-term
sustainable economic development, social equity, justice under the
law, the respect of human rights for all, and the establishment of
democratic systems in the region.
"When they came for the Jews, I did not speak out because
I was not a Jew. When they came for the Catholics, I did not speak out
because I was not a Catholic. When they came for the Protestants,
there was no one left to speak out for me."
(Words of a Protestant minister who lived in Germany
during the days of the Third Reich. Holocaust Museum, Washington,
D.C.)
Sincerely,
Rafael Echeverría G.
Practicing Attorney
Professor of International
Private Law
Universidad Rafael Urdaneta
Phone: 58-261-792.9794
|